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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis aims to juxtapose Freud's and Schopenhauer's doctrines, in the hopes of
reaching a richer understanding of both thinkers. This topic has been addressed in many
different ways in the past, but is far from exhausted. Both Freud and Schopenhauer believed
that the way we viewed the world and ourselves was lacking, to a certain extent even
distorted, and that such lack was due to our constitutional focus on ourselves, a focus
developed from the absolute need for self-preservation. They both also called for a truer less
distorted form of knowledge, a knowledge that could reach the essence of ourselves and
therefore of the world. Freud saw that his work grounded Schopenhauer's theories in the
everyday experience of individuals. This thesis attempts to continue what he started, it
attempts to bring those two daring minds closer together in order for such a mutual
augmentation to occur. The focal point of contact between the two will be art, the relevance
of which will be made clear as we move on (Freud, 1924, p.4128).
The thesis begins, in the second chapter, by giving an outline of one of
Schopenhauer's main philosophical concepts, namely, the will. The chapter will explore who
and what Schopenhauer believed to be to be his main influences, and will allow the reader to
get a clearer grasp on why he postulates that the experience of art, creating and contemplating
it, can be a way towards salvation for the human race. It will include a brief account of the
influence of Plato's and Kant's philosophies on one of his major concepts, his critique of
them, and how he combined their world views. It will also include his view on how, as
humans, we see the world around us in relation to our individual welfare and how, by
shedding such a form of knowledge, we can reach a pure form of knowledge of the world,
ourselves included. Finally, the importance of aesthetic contemplation and how it aids in the
process of reaching pure unclouded knowledge, and how the artist, a man of genius, manages
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to communicate his pure knowing to others through a work of art, is also discussed in this
chapter.
The third chapter focuses solely on the experience of art. Schopenhauer systematically
divides the arts into architecture, painting, sculpture, poetry, and music. He also explains how
and to what extent each could be used as a tool for reaching pure knowing, rating some above
the others. There will be a summary given for his view on each form of art and his argument
as to why some are considered transcendent while others merely pleasurable.
The fourth chapter gives an overview of Freud's main concepts, and how they
developed, giving the reader space to view them separately from Schopenhauer's but also to
begin to form her own opinion on the extent she believes the two thinkers' work is related. It
will explore the historical and theoretical context in which Freud was situated, how he came
across some of his major discoveries such as repression, the unconscious, the psychic
topography, and the importance of dreams in understanding our unconscious/hidden self. It
will also give some insight into the importance of art and aesthetics for psychoanalysis.
The fifth chapter draws on the most apparent similarities between Schopenhauer's and
Freud's work, mostly similarities Freud himself pointed out, then moves on to more
speculative similarities and starts raising some questions regarding the extent of
Schopenhauer's influence on Freud. Chapter five will be concluded by exploring
Schopenhauer's specific influence on Freud's view of art and how art could unlock the
mysteries of the unconscious.
The sixth and final chapter is a summing up of the previous chapters, exploring their
implications and what they mean for the future of psychoanalysis, the future of our view on
art and its importance for humanity, and of how Schopenhauer's philosophy could be
approached contemporarily.
The first obstacle I faced was in putting Freud into a philosophical context. Freud had
5

two problems in that regard; the first being that he disliked and opposed the idea of having
been influenced directly by anyone before him or of not being original, often making
statements like, “psycho-analysis is always without question my work alone” (Freud, 1914,
p.2878). We will see later how he vehemently denies being influenced by Schopenhauer,
claiming he hadn't read his work until later in life and that the similarity in their world views
was a coincidence. The second obstacle being that Freud was a physician and that the
scientific field during his time was heavily influenced by 19th century scientific empiricism
and was therefore, not welcoming of abstract theories. Psychiatry at the time functioned on a
biological model and anything that diverged from such biological views was considered
unscientific. Freud, being a man of science, faced the constant struggle of forcing
psychoanalysis into the scientific mold, often at the price of disavowing the philosophical
roots of psychoanalysis as we shall see later. The thesis is not meant as an act of
unfaithfulness in imparting Freud's thought, neither is it a mere laying forward of his and
Schopenhauer's thought as it is, it is rather an exploration of what it would mean for Freudian
psychoanalysis to let itself be directly and voluntarily influenced by philosophy, since, unlike
Freud, this thesis is under no obligation to 'appear scientific' or to cater to an enforced
paradigm (Freud, 1924, p.4101).
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Chapter 2:
Overview of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation:
The Will

Before we get into Schopenhauer's concept of the will, his theory on the essence of
things and how it could possibly be reached through art, we have first to understand how and
from where it sprang. In order to do that, we have to first get a glimpse of Kant's thing-initself, and Plato's Ideas.
One of the main concepts attributed to Kant is that of the thing-in-itself. Kant believed
that the whole of our knowledge and experience was merely knowledge of the phenomena
surrounding us and that we could never reach the knowledge underlying the phenomena i.e.
the thing-in-itself. He believed that time, space, and causality, the forms our knowledge is
conditioned by, and with which we perceive the world, belonged not to the thing-in-itself but
to its phenomena. Hence their laws couldn’t be valid for the thing-in-itself and its knowledge.
Since all plurality, all passing away and arising, are possible exclusively through time, space,
and causality, they, too, conform to the phenomenon alone and not the thing-in-itself. All this
means that even knowledge of our own selves is known to us only as phenomena and not initself. Schopenhauer believed that not only can we obtain such knowledge in the abstract as
Kant did but also intuitively, as we will see later (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.170).
Schopenhauer held both Kant and Plato in great reverence. He believed that the
seeming difference between Kant's thing-in-itself and Plato's eternal Ideas respectively, was
caused by their own personal individualities and style, and that the two concepts themselves
were very closely related. He didn't think that the two concepts were exactly identical but that
they were two different roads leading to the same goal. As we have seen with Kant and will
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now see with Plato, both doctrines claim that the phenomenal world as we see it is empty and
void and that its meaning is just the shadow of the thing which expresses itself in it, whether
it be Idea or thing-in-itself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.170-172).
Plato believed that nothing we perceive with our senses ever has any true being.
Everything is just in constant becoming, and hence a thing only has relative being through
interactions with other things, which means their being could just as well be called non-being.
Things in this sense can never be the object of knowledge, since for something to be an object
of knowledge it has to first exist on its own, through nothing else, as well as remain constant
and consistent. This makes such objects mere opinions or impressions brought about through
sensation. That being said, what is capable of being described as really existing are the
eternal Ideas, the original forms from which everything springs. Those eternal Ideas always
are, whether we are there to perceive them or not. Because of their consistency, it is only
through the Ideas that any knowledge is possible (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.171).
Anything that is a representation for us has to fall under the principle of sufficient
reason, which Schopenhauer defines as, “the ultimate principle of all finiteness, of all
individuation, and the universal form of the representation as it comes to the knowledge of
the individual as such” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.169). We conceive our representations
through the forms of sufficient reason, meaning, through time, space, and causality. In order
to be conceived by us, the Platonic Ideas go through a process of division, presenting
themselves in all individuals and unique details through space and time, and all arising and
passing away through causality. The divided Ideas presented to us are mere copies of the
Ideas themselves. The Ideas themselves never enter the principle of sufficient reason. The
principle has no meaning for them, and although they embody innumerable individuals who
are constantly arising and passing away, they themselves remain unchanged, hence we can
never attribute chance or plurality to them. It is clear by now that all subjective knowledge
8

has to pass through the principle of sufficient reason and therefor, Ideas are to remain outside
our sphere of knowledge. Kant directly deprived the thing-in-itself of the forms of sufficient
reason, while Plato denied his Ideas plurality, origination, and disappearance, in other words,
the consequences of those forms (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.171-172). If we want the Ideas
themselves to become the object of our knowledge, our only chance would be through
eradicating all individuality in the knowing subject in order to become pure subjects of
knowledge. Schopenhauer argues that this could be reached through art; his argument will be
made clear as we progress (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.169).
Schopenhauer saw that Kant's thing-in-itself was a weak link in Kantian philosophy,
especially given the way he inferred what is ground from what is grounded. He believed that
Kant slipped when he denied the thing-in-itself the forms of sufficient reason, namely time,
space, and causality, while not denying it the most universal form for all phenomena, namely
being-object-for-subject. He believed that the inconsistency in Kant's work arose from his not
denying being-object to his thing-in-itself. The Platonic Idea, on the other hand, is inevitably
an object. Although the Idea is denied the consequences of the forms of sufficient reason or
rather has not entered the principle of sufficient reason yet, it has accepted the most universal
form for all phenomena, the form on which all representation depends, namely and as stated
above, being an object for a subject. All things perceived by the individual subject of
knowing appear in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, which makes them the
indirect and therefore inadequate objectification of the thing-in-itself; the Idea on the other
hand, as perceived by the pure subject of knowing, doesn't function in accordance with any
principle of sufficient reason other than being object for a subject, making it the thing-initself under the form of representation. Now it's inferred that the Idea does not equal the
thing-in-itself, for Schopenhauer the Idea is the adequate, immediate objectivity of the thingin-itself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.174-175).
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This brings us to the Schopenhauerian concept of the 'will'. Schopenhauer argues that the
world besides being representation/phenomena is also one common will. The world as
representation being the will objectified, the will represented, becoming an object for us to
perceive. The will is the thing-in-itself while the Idea is the immediate objectivity of that will
at any specific given grade of objectivity. This objectification of the will contains many clear
grades, the higher the grade is, the clearer and more distinctly the inner nature of the will is
objectified/appears as representation. We recognize the Platonic Ideas in the grades of the
will's objectivity as long as the grades are the specific species, the universal forces that
function according to laws of nature, and known properties and forms of all-natural bodies
(Schopenhauer, 1969, p.169,175).
This will objectifies itself as life, as existence, in such endless succession and variety, in such
different forms, all of which are accommodations to the various external conditions, and can
be compared to many variations on the same theme. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.220)

There is one common will shared by everyone and everything in the world. It is
through being individual subjects of knowledge, and through our body being an object
amongst objects functioning under the principle of sufficient reason, that we can know of
particular things, of change, of plurality, and of events. Knowledge is the will's servant; it is,
in general, an objectification of the will at its higher grades, and the human's organic being,
be it brain, or nerves is the objectification of the will at that grade. Therefore, any
representation that arises through the human perception is an instrument which serves to aid
the will with maintaining and attending to the needs of such a complicated being. The
individual finds himself needing to act in relation and in connections with all other objects,
and in doing so is always lead back to his body, thus to his individual will. If our perception
didn't start from a body, which in itself is only concrete willing, the objects as we know them
would have disappeared from our knowledge, we would only understand the grades of the
will's objectivity, the Ideas, and the true nature of the thing-in-itself unclouded by
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individuality (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.175-176).
Now since as individuals we have no other knowledge than that which is subject to the
principle of sufficient reason, this form, however, excluding knowledge of the Ideas, it is
certain that, if it is possible for us to raise ourselves from knowledge of particular things to
that of the Ideas, this can happen only by a change taking place in the subject. Such a change
is analogous and corresponds to that great change of the whole nature of the object, and by
virtue of it the subject, in so far as it knows an Idea, is no longer individual. (Schopenhauer,
1969, p.176)

Knowledge, as we have seen, comes into being for the mere service of the will. For
the animals such servitude can never be avoided. For humans, on the other hand, avoidance is
possible, but only under certain prerequisites, one of them being the creation and the
reception of the fine arts. The moment such a transition in the status of knowledge occurs is
sudden and doesn't last for long. The subject's individuality ceases, he/she stops perceiving
objects in relation to his/her individual will, transcends the forms of sufficient reason, and
perceives the objects as they are and in-themselves divorced from all relations and
connections to other objects. “Thus we no longer consider the where, the when, the why, and
the whither in things, but simply and solely the what.” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.178)
When that 'remarkable' transition occurs, the human loses himself completely in his
object of perception, the boundaries between perceiver and perceived intertwine, and at that
moment the individual becomes a painless, will-less pure subject of knowing; it seems as if
the object existed on its own with no one perceiving it. The human becomes a mirror to the
object, his consciousness is no longer occupied with abstract thoughts or concepts of reason,
it's filled by nothing but the calm contemplation of the perceived object. Only through such
objective apprehension and contemplation of things can anything appear as delightful or
interesting. As opposed to passionate love, in aesthetic contemplation, the world appears as
beautiful to us, and that is so, only if it's freed from all relations to our individual wills, only
if it does not concern us (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.178-179, 1966, p.371-374).
When this type of contemplation happens both the object and the individual are raised
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above themselves, the object is no longer a particular thing, it becomes an Idea of its species,
and the individual no longer perceives particular things but rather one who perceives Ideas.
Now, like the Idea, the individual becomes outside the forms of sufficient reason; time, space,
and causality have no meaning for him; the world as representation comes to the forefront,
the will, now adequately objectified by the Idea, attains complete objectification
(Schopenhauer, 1969, p.179).
Within the Idea, there exists both subject and object, but they are both of equal worth,
the object becomes the mere representation of the subject and the subject by intertwining with
the object becomes the object itself. This is possible because at that moment of pure
representation and complete objectivity of the will, the common will, shared by both the
subject and the object, as the in-itself of the Idea, becomes completely objectified in both.
Through their shared awareness the will then recognizes itself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.180).
What pushed Schopenhauer to view aesthetic contemplation as the surest way to reach
the state of pure contemplation was his observation on how humans view their encounters
with the sublime in nature. When we view raging sea waves from afar for example, we first
realize how small, weak, and insignificant we are in comparison, but then we lose ourselves
in the object of our contemplation, we feel that through our common will we are one with the
sublime object of nature. That lead him to conclude that the main aim of art seems to be
presenting and expressing Ideas at all possible grades of the will's objectivity (Schopenhauer,
1969, p.252).
The mother of the useful arts is necessity; that of the fine arts is superfluity and abundance. As
their father, the former has understanding, the later genius, which is in itself a kind of
superfluity, that of the power of knowledge beyond the measure required for the service of the
will. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.410)

When Schopenhauer writes about the fine arts and the artists behind them, it is to be
assumed that he's writing about the genuine genius and not any other type of artist. An outline
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of what he considers as genius is, therefore, necessary at this point. Genius is a prevailing
capacity for knowledge of the perception/representations. One which Schopenhauer firmly
believed was the source of great art, poetry, and philosophy. This type of knowledge requires
that the genuine work of art doesn't follow from either contemplation or choice, it rather
follows from an instinctive necessity, or what we know as moments of rapture or inspiration.
At those moments the artist is relieved from the service of the will and reaches the greatest
purity of knowing. The Platonic Ideas, being the object of everything, are also the object of
genius, the difference being that with genius they are not apprehended in the abstract, but
rather in perception. It is in this full and clear knowledge of perception that the true nature of
genius lies. Genius, for Schopenhauer, springs from the same place and starting point as the
ordinary intellect. What then happens is a “positive deformity” where the genius is given an
abnormal excess of intellect. The genius can't help but perceive the world in its wholeness; he
has too much intellect for the service of the mere individual will and hence has to employ his
genius universally in the service of the whole human race (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.376-7,
380).
As humans we have two types of consciousness, one is our self-consciousness,
consciousness of our individual will, and the other is consciousness of everything else that is
will, namely the perceptual apprehension of objects. The two types coexist within the human
but as one increases the other has to decrease. The genius is capable of momentarily quieting
and denying his individual will, and of reaching enough serenity to enthusiastically enjoy life
while forgetting about all personal cares and worries. This self-denial comes at a price
though, the whole world as representation becomes condensed in his consciousness, he
becomes aware of the in-itself of life, of the uselessness of existence, and that the will is
constant suffering and fear; which in turn causes him to deny his individual will and to isolate
himself from the rest of humanity (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.267, 1966, p.380, 383).
13

There is a fine line between genius and madness for Schopenhauer. The reason being
that for both the madman and the genius, knowledge is separated from the will; the difference
being that such separation occurs in the man of genius because of an excess of such
knowledge, for the madman on the other hand, the will withdraws itself from the governing
of knowledge and of all motives, the result being an unrestricted will moving blindly and
destroying everything in its way. What most clearly sets the genius and the madman apart for
Schopenhauer is the ability and power of reflection. Through a strong power of reflection, the
artist is able to tangibly present all he has before his eyes, and to express, what others merely
feel, in clear words bringing them to consciousness. The madman, on the other hand, lacks
the power of reflection and is incapable of reflecting on his present, past, or future
(Schopenhauer, 1966, p.382, 387, 402).
Talent is able to achieve what is beyond other people’s capacity to achieve, yet not what is
beyond their capacity of apprehension; therefore it at once finds its appreciators. The
achievement of genius, on the other hand, transcends not only others’ capacity of achievement,
but also their capacity of apprehension; therefore they do not become immediately aware of it.
Talent is like the marksman who hits a target which others cannot reach; genius is like the
marksman who hits a target, as far as which others cannot even see. (Schopenhauer, 1966,
p.391)

The difference between the genius and someone with ordinary intellect doesn't make
itself clear right away, the genius still has to consider himself in relation to time and space in
order to survive in everyday life even if it causes him discomfort and melancholia. What sets
the genius apart from others are the achievements he accomplishes due to his original and
crucial knowledge of perception (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.378). Unlike mere talent which is
too tied to the will, and which manifests itself in accurate and rapid thinking of discursive
knowledge, genius is original knowledge, that is, foreign even to the artist's own ego. Where
the ordinary man sees the world in its particularity and in relation to himself, the genius sees
the universal in the particular to the extent that he even often forgets about his own wellbeing
and needs (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.377-379, 384-385). Thus, the genius becomes a clear
mirror to the world, “He does not live, like others, only in the microcosm, but still more in the
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macrocosm. For this reason, the whole concerns him, and he tries to grasp it, in order to
present it, or explain it, or act on it in practice. For to him it is not strange; he feels that it
concerns him. On account of this extension of his sphere, he is called great” (Schopenhauer,
1966, p.385).
That's why, according to Schopenhauer, the easiest route for genius to manifest itself,
is through the plastic arts (e.g. painting and sculpting). There the genius has only to replicate
and project his perception masterfully. With philosophy and poetry, the process is harder
since genius is appealing to the imagination to transfer language (known to be associated with
reason) into the realm of perception (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.378).
The work of genius as stated above arises out of Ideas, as opposed to concepts which
are the source of scientific knowledge. The difference being that science works at the service
of the will, it focuses on the concepts, on mere discursive knowledge connecting things to
each other investigating their relations, and viewing such knowledge in its completeness. The
man of science and reason always looks for functionality, for what is needed at a given time
for a given situation. The man of genius on the other hand is too engrossed in objectivity to
function in that way, a prerequisite for great art is, in fact, its uselessness and unprofitability.
This difference between the genius and the man of science and talent explains for
Schopenhauer why throughout history men of science seem to have always appeared in the
right time, while men of genius always seem to be in conflict with their times. It also explains
why the work of genius has a durability causing it to last for centuries while the work of
science or talent seems to be constantly replaced (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.387, 390).
The Idea is conditionally communicable depending on the receiver's intellectual
capacity, the receiver has to put himself in the frame of mind of the genius, that's why the
most genius works in fine art are deemed obscure and inaccessible to the majority of humans.
The apprehension of the Idea demands a change in the receiver; in order for an Idea to reach
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our consciousness, an act of self-denial i.e. a denial of the individual will, and perceiving
things in a way that completely ignores the individual will is required. Thus, leaving space
for the pure mirroring of the objective essence of things. The change in the receiver, since it
requires a denial of the individual will, can never originate from the individual will, it rather
originates from a “temporary preponderance” of the intellect, meaning a strong pure
perceptual brain excitation (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.234, 1966, p.376).
Concept and Idea are fundamentally different, but what they have in common is that
as unities, they both represent a plurality of actual things (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.226). The
Idea is the unity that has been divided through the spatial and temporal forms of our intuitive
apprehension. The concept on the other hand, is the unity of the plurality of the modes of
intuitive apprehension mentioned above, this plurality is produced through abstraction by the
faculty of reason. The Idea is alive in him who cares to grasp it, and it is ever-evolving,
always producing more than has been placed into it. While the concept is what Schopenhauer
calls a dead receptacle, it's a vessel that merely holds what has been put inside, and where
nothing new can come out (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.235).
With its ever-evolving productive nature, the Idea draws its originality from life itself,
from the world, and from nature, and only an artist of genuine genius or a man who was
struck briefly by genius would be able to bring it forth to our perception. Since the Idea has to
remain in perception, it has to be communicated through the artwork itself. No genuine artist
would be able to give a verbal conscious conceptualization of his work “He cannot give an
account of his action”. He rather works instinctively, unconsciously and from mere feeling.
This doesn't mean the artist doesn't have to think about the work of art being done; some
thought is usually needed for clarifying the internal Idea but is never the source
(Schopenhauer, 1969, 235, 1966, p.409).
The Idea being the only source of art doesn't stop some from trying to create art
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through concepts, through mimicking, recycling, and sucking the nourishment out of genuine
works of art. Schopenhauer has a lot of contempt for such imitators of art, even if they have
skill and talent. The genuine artist on the other hand contains a productive force, he absorbs
and learns from the works of other geniuses but never lets this learning come in the way of
his originality; he draws his inspiration from his perceived impressions of life and nature
itself. As was mentioned earlier, works that are generated from concepts appeal to the
existing public when the concept portrayed is in fashion, but after a few years the concept
becomes uninteresting and incoherent, while genuine works of art remain eternal, just like
life and nature themselves (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.236, 1966, p.410).
Schopenhauer differentiates between the outward and inward significance of actions,
the outward significance being of consequence in the actual world and functioning under the
principle of sufficient reason, and the inward significance being deep insight into the Idea of
mankind shedding light on parts of it that are usually ignored. The outward and the inward
are independent of each other and can easily appear on their own, this is why a historically
significant action, for example, can have a very trivial inner significance while a scene from
everyday life depicted in a work of art can have great inner significance. Art is only
concerned with the inner significance of things, the outer is of no use to it (Schopenhauer,
1969, p.230-232).
Not merely philosophy but also the fine arts work at bottom towards the solution of the
problem of existence. For in every mind which once gives itself up to the purely objective
concealed and unconscious, to comprehend the true nature of things, of life, and of existence...
the result of every purely objective, and so of every artistic, apprehension of things is an
expression more of the true nature of life and of existence, more an answer to the question,
“What is life?” Every genuine and successful work of art answers this question calmly and
serenely. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.406)

Fine art is of great importance and value since it encompasses the world as
representation in its fullness, achieving what the world as representation achieves but with
much greater concentration, intelligence, perfection, and intention. Works of art aim to show
17

us things as they are in reality by taking away the mist of subjective and objective
contingencies. On the one hand, if the world as representation is the mirror and
objectification of the will, following it to knowledge of itself, then we will find in art the
clarification of such objectivity and the way in which we can begin to comprehend the will
i.e. a possibility of salvation. On the other hand, art aids us in contemplating the world as
representation isolated and free from the will's control, and losing ourselves in
representations in that way is, according to Schopenhauer, one of the most innocent and
delightful sides of life (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.266-267).
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Chapter 3:
Overview of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation:
Hierarchy of The Arts

Below will be given a summary of the different forms of art Schopenhauer addressed
in the two editions of The World as Will and Representation. Schopenhauer's theory of
aesthetics is based on both his metaphysics and his knowledge of the different forms of art.
Each form of art is placed in a different spot on the scale of the grades of the will's
objectification, but it's important for him that we recognize that it is the same will, which is
already in everyone and everything, depicted in all of them, only with different grades of
visibility.

Architecture:

Architecture is a fine art, in so far as it's not considered from the angle of its will
serving useful purposes. Considered from its pure, knowledge serving, angle, architecture is a
fine art which brings to our awareness the Ideas at the lowest grade of the will's objectivity.
Architecture reveals the basic ideas, the simplest most fundamental visibilities of the will,
such as cohesion, gravity, rigidity, hardness, and complementary to those, also light. Even at
such a low grade of objectivity, one can perceive the will's fundamental discord in
architecture; its constant theme is support and load, the delicate suspended conflict and play
between the two incorporating all the above-mentioned ideas is what deems it beautiful.
Therefore, the whole is dependent on the interplay of the parts and every part is determined
by its relation to the whole (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.214-215).
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Another art which similarly depicts an interplay between such basic ideas like gravity
and rigidity is hydraulics (the artistic arrangement of water). What leaves hydraulics lacking
in the face of architecture is that it doesn't combine the practical with the aesthetic.
Architecture, on the other hand, has the downside of being limited by its material, it can
unfold all the different forces and ideas inherent in “stone” but it can go no further. In so far
as architecture affects us artistically, it affects us dynamically through the above mentionedideas, rather than mathematically though form, proportion and symmetry which are properties
of space rather than ideas (Schopenhauer, 1969, p214-15, 1966, p.411,414).
Architecture is the only one of the fine arts that serves a practical purpose, it is very
rarely created for mere artistic purposes, and herein lies both its uniqueness and limitation. It
accomplishes purely aesthetic ends despite its subordination to practical ends foreign to art.
On the one side it's restricted by the demands of utility and necessity, and on the other side
those same restrictions are what allows it to maintain its status as a fine art. Since considering
its narrow sphere, being limited by its material, and its offering the lowest grades of the will's
objectivity, architecture wouldn't be strong enough as a self-sustaining art (Schopenhauer,
1969, p.217).
Amongst the fine arts, architecture, music, and poetry are the only ones that offer the
thing itself, the complete expression of the Idea, rather than a copy of it through the eyes of
the artist. In architecture the artist presents the object/matter itself clearly allowing it the
ultimate expression of its nature and hence making it easy for the receiver to subjectively
apprehend the Idea (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.217).
The artistic contemplation of architecture is an affective pure contemplation where the
contemplator is freed from the suffering of individuality and of the will, and becomes a willless subject of knowing. The delight of the receiver is not caused by the immediate
apprehension of the Idea, but rather through the subjective correlative of that apprehension,
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the pure will-less knowing. As we move from one fine art to another we will witness varying
grades of the will's objectivity, and the higher the grade of the will's objectification, the more
the contemplator will be able to shed her subjectivity and aesthetically enjoy the objective
side (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.216).

Plastic and Pictorial arts:
Painting:

The real aim of painting and the fine arts, in general, is to help us comprehend the
Ideas concerning the nature of the world, all whilst putting us in a state of pure will-less
knowing through the aesthetic contemplation of objective beauty. In addition to this objective
beauty, there is a subordinate type of beauty we find produced through the mere harmony of
colors, toning, agreeable distribution of light and shade, and through grouping. This
subordinate type of beauty is not vital, but it's what initially acts on the subject, it's what
catches the human attention and is consequently what facilitates the conditions of pure willless knowing (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.422).
Painting as a fine art is generally at a higher grade of the will's objectification than
architecture. Within itself, different types of painting are assigned different grades of the
will's objectification. The lowest grade of the will's objectification in painting belongs to still
life painting followed by landscape painting. In still life painting, like in architecture, the
subjective side is predominant. In those two types of painting the artist allows us to see
through his eyes, and through our subjectively induced sympathy we come to feel and inhabit
his state of spiritual peace emanating from the complete silencing of the will he had to
achieve in order to be able to immerse knowledge of the Idea so deeply in inanimate objects
and with such a degree of objectivity. Since landscape painting is at a higher grade of the
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will's objectivity, and since the Ideas revealed in it are more suggestive and significant, the
above mentioned subjective side of aesthetic pleasure is balanced out with the objective.
Hence in landscape painting pure will-less knowing is not the main objective, the known
Idea, the world as representation becomes an objective just as equally (Schopenhauer, 1969,
p.218-219).
Following landscape painting at a higher grade of the will's objectivity is animal
painting. In animal paintings, the objective aesthetic pleasure has an obvious supremacy over
the subjective aesthetic pleasure. In the contemplation of animal paintings, we find the
subjective aesthetic pleasure in the spiritual peace, channeled from the artist to the receiver
through the artwork, mentioned above, as is the case with any aesthetic contemplation. The
difference lies in the fact that its effect is not felt since, through the objective contemplation,
the receiver is preoccupied with the frenzy and discord of the depicted will. In animal
paintings, we see the will, which constitutes our inner nature, extricated from the control we
display over it through thoughtfulness and reason. The will's stronger traits then lay naked
before us in clear forms and figures verging on the monstrous and grotesque (Schopenhauer,
1969, p.219).
This brings us to the next type of painting and the highest grade of the will's
objectivity in painting, namely human paintings. “Human beauty is an objective expression
that denotes the will’s most complete objectification at the highest grade at which this is
knowable, namely the Idea of man in general, completely and fully expressed in the
perceived form” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.221). The difficulty that faces the artist in depicting
human beauty is that even at such a high grade of the will's objectivity, the subjective could
never be completely separated from the objective. The human form as an object is one of the
strongest when it comes to subjective contemplation, nothing induces pure will-less knowing
more, it causes humans to transcend themselves, their personalities, pain, and everything that
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torments them. An appropriate depiction of beauty as the character of the individual wouldn't
be possible unless the Idea the individual manifests is not seen as an accidental trait special to
him/her, but rather as a side of the general Idea of mankind appearing clearly in a particular
individual. The individual always belongs to humanity (its species), and humanity can only
reveal itself through the individual (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.221-225). “No individual and no
action can be without significance; in all and through all, the Idea of mankind unfolds itself
more and more” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.230).
The artist presents nature as he has never seen it, he surpasses nature through his a
priori anticipation of the ideal, such anticipation is possible especially for the artist whose
gaze is clearer than everyone else since humans are the will itself at its highest objectification
merely waiting to be discovered and judged. Humans generally have the capacity of a priori
anticipation to a certain extent, it is how they recognize the beautiful in nature. Just as the
artist anticipates the beautiful a priori, the receiver recognizes it a posteriori even upon never
seeing it before and this is further proof that they are the “in-itself” of nature, they are the will
objectifying itself. This a priori anticipation of the beautiful accompanied by reason,
experience and a high degree of thoughtful intelligence is what allows the artist to quickly
perceive in the individual thing its idea, to understand, and to articulate nature's half-spoken
words (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.222-223).
He impresses on the hard marble the beauty of the form which nature failed to achieve in a
thousand attempts, and he places it before her, exclaiming as it were, “This is what you desired
to say!” And from the man who knows comes the echoing reply, “Yes, that is it!” Only in this
way was the Greek genius able to discover the prototype of the human form, and to set it up as
the canon for the school of sculpture. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.222)

The quote above illustrates a priori anticipation in human sculpture and how it's
clearly present in the Greek sculpting of human forms. For the Greek sculptors every human
limb and every movement they perceived in nature was compared to their a priori halfconscious ideal and therefore was subject to their constant criticism and comparison. Only in
this way were they able to bring out openly to their consciousness that a priori half-conscious
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ideal, and only then were they able to reflect on it and objectify it clearly in a work of art
(Schopenhauer, 1966, p.420).
Everything mentioned above concerning painting applies to sculpture according to
Schopenhauer, the hierarchy of the grades of the objectivity of the will is the same, the
highest grade being human sculpture followed by animal sculpture. The difference between
painting and sculpture starts to become clearer when a distinction is made between beauty, in
its objective sense, and grace. Beauty being the proper objectification of the will through
solely spatial phenomenon, the position that objectifies the will. While grace being the proper
objectification of the will through solely temporal phenomenon, the movement that
objectifies the will in its most purely adequate expression. The two together represent the
clearest phenomenon of the will at the highest grade of its objectification (Schopenhauer,
1969, p.223-224).
Beauty and grace are the main objectives of sculpture, while character, expression,
and passion predominate in painting. Painting, unlike sculpture, therefore, has a tolerance for
the ugly, it even requires that a lot of the claims of beauty be given up for the sake of the
characteristic. Sculpture on the other hand, through its great demand for a universal beauty of
all forms, detracts from the characteristic. From this point of view, Schopenhauer concluded
that sculpture as a fine art was suitable for the affirmation of the will, while painting was
suitable for the denial of the will (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.419).

Poetry:

Schopenhauer defines poetry as “The art of bringing into play the power of
imagination through words.” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.424) The aim of poetry as a fine art is
to reveal the Idea, to convey to its receiver the grades of the will's objectification clearly as
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they have been revealed to and understood by the mind of the poet (Schopenhauer, 1969,
p.242).
The true poet, a mind rich in ideas, always communicates his thoughts in the most
straightforward, candid way; guided by the moment of inspiration, he doesn't consider how
the work will be received nor does he have any external motives. He gathers and brings to our
attention everything which is significant and essential while eliminating everything
unnecessary and accidental. The false poet guided by how others would perceive him, on the
other hand, hides his poverty of mind through being obscure and using uncalled for complex
vocabulary. The true poet writes in order to communicate with others the loneliness he feels
after discovering the world for what it is with clarity (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.229, p.248).
The genuine poet's work remains meaningful and current for thousands of years, and
this wouldn't be the case if he merely presented current phenomena or the popular concepts of
his time. The poet has to become the mirror of mankind which reflects its inner nature back to
it. His poetry reflects all the recurring situations humans have found, find, and will ever find
themselves in, and how those situations will always affect human nature through its common
will. Everything that stirs the human heart, that dwells in the human breast, and nature itself
are the materials and themes the poet uses to produce his poetry. The poet being the mirror of
mankind and having such a wide sphere of knowledge to draw from, has the ability to
transform himself entirely, to completely embody each and every character he presents
whether superficially different or similar to himself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.249, 1966,
p.433).
In the plastic and pictorial arts, using allegory takes away from their perception, it
distracts the receiver from the given perception and leads him towards abstract
thoughts/concepts. For poetry whose aim, like all art, is the knowledge of the Idea, the
opposite is true. In poetry, the concept is first given in words, with the goal of leading the
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receiver towards the perceptive. The perceptive in this case has to be conceived in the
imagination of the receiver. The concept itself is neither the source nor the goal of the
artwork. The concept is the material immediately given, the vehicle which leads to the
perceptive and eventually to the Idea (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.240).
Many a concept or abstract thought may be indispensable in the sequence and connexion of a
poem, while in itself and immediately it is quite incapable of being perceived. It is then often
brought to perception by some example to be subsumed under it. This occurs in every
figurative expression, in every metaphor, simile, parable, and allegory, all of which differ only
by the length and completeness of their expression. Therefore similes and allegories are of
striking effect in the rhetorical arts. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.240)

The poet has to always be careful not to get carried away with the abstract universality
of the concepts. Through arranging the intersections of the concepts, he uses and
harmoniously combining them, he is able to wrench the concrete, individual, representation
of perception, out of the abstract universality of the concepts (Schopenhauer, 1969, p243).
A clue with which we can recognize the true poet is that he has an unforced easy
nature to his rhymes; easy to the extent that we feel that they have dawned on him at the same
moment the Ideas did. Rhythm and rhyme serve as aids to poetry, they are what engages and
grabs the attention of the receiver before he could form any aesthetic judgments, and they are
what gives a poem an empathetic power of conviction independent of all reason. Despite their
importance, rhythm and rhyme could also be used as a veil which the poet uses to feel safe
enough to say what otherwise could not be said. Rhythm according to Schopenhauer has its
essence in time only so in Kantian terminology it belongs to pure sensibility, while rhyme, on
the other hand, has its essence in sensation in the ears, therefore, it belongs to empirical
sensibility. For Schopenhauer, this amounts to the conviction that rhythm is much worthier
and dignified than rhyme. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.243-244, 1966, p.427-429)
The range of dominion of poetry is far greater than the other arts in virtue of concepts
being the material it uses to communicate Ideas. Ideas of all grades of the will's objectivity
can be expressed through poetry. It particularly exceeds other art forms when it is expressing
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the Idea of the highest grade of the will's objectivity, namely the Idea of mankind. When it
comes to the Ideas at the lowest grade of the will's objectivity though, plastic and pictorial art
fare better than poetry since for inanimate objects and animals the Ideas that reveal their inner
being can be expressed in a well devised moment. The Idea of man, on the other hand,
requires movement and progression which is found in poetry and not in the plastic and
pictorial arts (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.244, 1966, p.424). “Revelation of that Idea which is the
highest grade of the will’s objectivity, namely the presentation of man in the connected series
of his efforts and actions, is thus the great subject of poetry.” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.244)
The Idea of man is not merely revealed in his form and expressions, it's revealed in his
sequence of actions accompanied by various thoughts and emotions (Schopenhauer, 1969,
p.244). Poetry also has a flexibility not found in the plastic and pictorial arts given that its
representations take place entirely in the imagination of the receiver. It allows for a
development tailored according to each individual's scope of knowledge and frame of mind
and hence allows for the most vivid representations. The appreciation of plastic and pictorial
arts, on the other hand, demands a certain level of cultivation and knowledge; they cannot
conform to each individual mind they rather provide one moment to satisfy all
(Schopenhauer, 1966, p.424-425).
Our personal experience is the necessary dictionary with which we understand the
language of both history and poetry. We've already seen above that poetry seeks to know and
understand the inner nature of man, removed from all time and relations, and history
accordingly has something in common with poetry, history teaches us what is true in the
universal, to know man/men, the behavior of men amongst themselves, and mostly it gives us
rules of conduct based on empirical data. Although history doesn't seem to be interested in
the inner individual nature of man Schopenhauer argues that some historians see history with
artistic eyes, perceiving the Idea rather than the phenomenon or concept and that in cases
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such as these man feels he has experienced history poetically. The same goes for personal
experience; he believes humans have the capacity to view their experiences with artistic eyes
and hence view them poetically (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.244).
Different types of poetry exhibit different grades of the will's objectivity, and in
poetry, this mostly depends on the poet since we now know that the Idea of mankind
develops within the poet and that therefore the line between the depicter and the depicted is
blurred. There are countless degrees of comprehension of things, of depth, and of clearness of
ideas, and there are just as many poets. Excellence in poetry is not measured by the degrees
mentioned above, but rather by how the poet, regardless of his degree, is able to reach the
most clarity in depicting all he knows. The two extreme degrees on the poetic objectification
of the will continuum are, lyric poetry/song proper, where the poet (vividly) describes his
own state hence requiring a great deal of subjectivity, and the tragedy, where the poet's
subjectivity completely disappears in front of the depicted. Although all forms of poetry
require a genius artist, Schopenhauer believes the tragedy to be the most complete form and
the hardest to achieve. Starting from the most subjective, after the poetry/song proper comes,
the ballad, the idyll, the romance, the epic proper, and finally the drama/tragedy
(Schopenhauer, 1969,248-248, 1966, p.425).
The characteristic nature of the song or lyric proper considered in the narrowest sense
deems it, on one side, the projected willing of the poet, all willing which fills his
consciousness be it the satisfied willing with all its joy or the unsatisfied willing with the
sorrow it brings. On the other side, and simultaneously with it, the poet through
contemplating his surroundings, becomes a subject of pure will-less knowing. This latter state
of peace produced by the silencing of the will appears in contrast to the former state of
agitation and passion; this contrast and interplay blended to perfection by the poet, is what
constitutes the ideal lyrical state. The receiver feels the pure will-less knowing as it delivers
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her from the turmoil of willing. The genuine song is an expression of a state of mind where
the subjective will and the objective pure perception collide (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.250).
The more objective kinds of poetry such as the romance, the epic, and the epic proper,
don't have the same interplay as the lyric proper does, although the subjectivity of the poet
doesn't completely disappear in them, they rather reveal the Idea of mankind through
intelligently presenting significant characters and creating a charged situation where those
characters can present their inner nature. Those kinds of poetry objectify the Idea of man and
reveal the depths of the human mind because the Idea of man has the ability to adequately
express itself in remarkably individual characters (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.251, 252, 1966,
p.432).
“At the moment of the tragic catastrophe, we become convinced more clearly than
ever that life is a bad dream from which we have to awake” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.433).
Tragedy, the highest poetical achievements, has one main goal, that is, to portray the terrible
side of life, “The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind, the triumph of
wickedness, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the
innocent are all here presented to us; and here is to be found a significant hint as to the nature
of the world and of existence. It is the antagonism of the will with itself which is here most
completely unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity, and which comes into fearful
prominence” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.252-253). Tragedy shows the suffering of humans both
by the hands of fate through chance and error, and by the hands of humans themselves
through the self-mortifying behaviors of their individual will, or through the perversity and
wickedness of humans towards one another. The antagonism of the will with itself causes the
humans who fundamentally share the same will to violently attack one another; they act
motivated by and in relation to their surrounding phenomena therefor egoistically. This willinduced violence is only softened by the light of knowledge, refined and purified by suffering
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itself, this goes on until the individual reaches the point where all veils are removed, then and
only then do the previously powerful motives lose their force and does the real nature of the
world act as quitter of the will and inducer of a state of resignation, and eventually leading to
salvation i.e. not only giving up life but also giving up the will-to-live. That's why we often
see in tragedy the noblest of men, after sudden intense suffering, start to renounce all worldly
pleasures and gladly give up on life itself (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.253). The receiver's
pleasure in poetry doesn't belong to the realm of the beautiful, it belongs to the realm of the
sublime and the highest grade of it too. By allowing us to find pleasure in something which
opposes the will, tragedy forces us to lose interest in the will to live in order to act in a purely
perceptive way; through transcending the will to live we come to learn something that we
could have never learned positively, we understand that life can never offer us true
satisfaction and hence is not worth our attachment to it, we learn “that which does not will
life” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.433).
Poetry and philosophy are related in so far as they both seek knowledge of the Idea, of
the inner being of humanity; difference arises in the way they seek that knowledge. We
already know the poet reaches the knowledge of the Idea through first exploring the particular
and individual in life and humans, and then accurately describing them and using them as
examples, until he reaches the knowledge of the whole of human existence/the Idea. So,
although he appears interested in the individual he actually uses it as a means to reach the
whole. That's why, taken out of the context of the poems, some sentences that tragic poets
wrote hundreds of years ago are still relatable and find frequent application in real life.
Philosophy, on the other hand, reaches the knowledge of the Idea through seeking the inner
nature of things/the truth, which expresses itself in poetry and other fine arts. Schopenhauer
analogized the relationship of poetry to philosophy, to that of experience to the empirical
science; whilst experiences/poetry attempts to acquaint us with the particular and the
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individually important, empirical science/philosophy attempts to acquaint us with the totality
of the phenomenon through universal concepts. He also suggested that philosophy was more
attached to reality or in another sense older and wiser than poetry, since poetry, naïve and
youthful, shows the interesting side of life divorced from the painful, even in the cases of
dramatic and tragic poetry, while in reality, life is only interesting when there's pain
(Schopenhauer, 1966, p.427).
We have thus far considered the fine arts as Schopenhauer classified them. We started
with architecture as the objectification of the will at the lowest grade of its visibility,
revealing minimal signs of the will's discord through the conflict between gravity and
rigidity. Our consideration of the arts ended with tragedy, which revealed to us, with the most
clarity, the highest grade of the will's objectification, namely the extreme internal discord of
the will. Schopenhauer separates music from the rest of the fine arts, the reason why will be
made clear as we proceed (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.255-256).

Music:

Music, unlike the other arts, does not work on copying or projecting Ideas regarding
the inner nature of mankind, it rather transcends the perceptual world, it is a universal
language which deeply moves man's innermost being. While the other forms of art stimulate
the knowledge of the Ideas through presenting them in individual artistic works, inevitably
entering the principle of sufficient reason in the process, music passes over the Ideas, freeing
itself from the phenomenal world. Music is the most immediate and direct copy of the will
itself without the interference of Ideas; compared to music all other arts speak of mere
shadows while music speaks of the essence. Although both Ideas and music are
objectification of the will, and although there are as many grades of the objectification of the
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will in music as there are Ideas, they do not objectify it in the same way but rather through
parallel ways. Schopenhauer points out how difficult it is to grasp such an obscure notion
since what he's claiming is that music is a representation of the will, the will which we
already know could never be directly represented (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.257).
Melody, however, says more; it relates the most secret history of the intellectually enlightened
will, portrays every agitation, every effort, every movement of the will, everything which the
faculty of reason summarizes under the wide and negative concept of feeling, and which
cannot be further taken up into the abstractions of reason. Hence it has always been said that
music is the language of feeling and of passion, just as words are the language of reason.
(Schopenhauer, 1969, p.259)

The melody for Schopenhauer mirrors man's inner nature; it mirrors the constant
fruitless striving towards the satisfaction of desires. For humans, the lack of satisfaction is
suffering, and the lack of young desire is stillness, boredom, and we see this striving depicted
in the nature and structure of the melody itself. Music through its constant succession of
cords, alternating between some exciting desire and some satisfying it, mirrors the life of the
will; and just as the will's most significantly felt satisfaction and relief follows from the most
intense desire we see how the satisfaction in the melody is intensified through delay and
momentary dissatisfaction. Therefore, the creation of the melody is the work of remarkable
unprecedented genius, a genius who has abandoned all conscious intention, all reflection, and
who solely relies on inspiration. The composer (musical genius), mirrors the world and
expresses it with extreme clarity in a language which his faculty of reason does not
comprehend. His work stems completely out of the unconscious, explaining how more than
any other artist we see in him a distinct separation between the man and the artist
(Schopenhauer, 1969, p.260, 1966, p.455-456).
Every possible event and manifestation of the will that takes place within man, all
manifestations which our faculty of reason allocates under the concept of emotions, can be
projected through the infinite possible melodies, but only according to the kernel, the in-itself
of the phenomena freed from its body. The melody never supplies us with specific emotions,
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the strong affectations the experience of music provides us with, are our attempt to shape the
invisible, to grasp the ungraspable will, and as our imagination is already easily stirred by
music, we project suitable emotions on the music (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.261-262).
Just as the Idea of mankind as the highest grade of the will's objectification doesn't
exist independent of other lower grades of the will's objectification, music as the complete
objectivity of the will doesn't exist without the harmony which rises out of the interaction and
union between the different grades of the will's objectification. It is only in such harmony and
union does music make the inner discord of the will clearly visible (Schopenhauer, 1969,
p.265-266).
Schopenhauer stresses the opinion that music is not a mere aid to poetry and that it
could exist independent of it. He goes further to argue that music is the most powerful of all
arts since it is self-sufficient, meaning it finds its resources within itself. He even argues that
if words are added to music, they have to remain in a subordinate position adapting
themselves completely to it, and in the rare cases where the words inspire the composer,
words still remain subordinate since the composer brings out an inner meaning underlying the
words which could have never been reached without music. The reason we welcome poetry
with music and find joy in it is that our most direct and indirect methods of knowledge are
stimulated at the same time in complete unity, we receive the movements of the will
accompanied by their objects (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.448-449).
Music like tragedy presents to us the vivid suffering common to the human will, but
they never cause us actual suffering, they maintain a pleasurable sensation even in their most
painful parts. This is because we enjoy perceiving the veiled side of our will which contains
all its strivings, afflictions, and sorrow. In real life our experience of suffering is different
because we don't objectively perceive it as we do with the arts, our subjectivity causes us to
view everything, including suffering, in relation to our individual will (Schopenhauer, 1966,
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p,451).
Finally, Schopenhauer placed architecture and music at the extreme ends of the
spectrum. They contrast in almost all aspects even in the form of their appearance, given the
fact that architecture solely exists in space, with no reference to time, while music exists
solely in time with no reference to space (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.453).
In conclusion, presented above was the summary of Schopenhauer's full series on the
arts and how they reveal to us knowledge concerning our existence, on different grades of the
will's objectivity. Why it was important for him to do so and why instead of opting for
creating art himself he chose to write about it is a question he more or less answered when he
wrote about the philosophy of history. For him history as we know it is never truthful since it
only speaks of specific events and individuals, leading us to only reflect back on our
subjective wills. What Schopenhauer calls for is for us to realize that however different the
events and individuals we discuss are, and however many decades separate them, the
will/essence in them remains one and the same, constantly and forever repeating itself. What
his writing calls for is the awareness of such repetition, of finding the common
consciousness, the common qualities in humanity, the bad before the good, and in realizing
that whatever change we see in cultures or individuals is but a triviality. In the power of
writing, he sees an act of defiance, against time which buries the Ideas and leaves us to start
anew. In such defiance we would stand even against death which constantly interrupts the
realization of the common consciousness. Through writing, a thought started by one person
could be continued decades later by another, and understanding the past in such an active way
would help in understanding ourselves, our present, and drawing conclusions as to the future.
What philosophy aims to do is create concepts and a permanent universal knowledge out of
the fleeting images and moments when art provides us with the truth concerning life. Since
however accurately art shows us the truth concerning life, that knowledge is always fleeting
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and ungraspable. What Schopenhauer is aiming for is an immortal truth (Schopenhauer,
1969, p.406, 444-446).
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Chapter 4: Overview on Freud

Before delving into Freud's take on art and Schopenhauer's both direct and indirect
influence on him, it's best to give a summary of psychoanalysis, its basic concepts, and their
application.
Freud was a physician interested in mental disturbances, in “functional” nervous
diseases (what later came to be called neuroses), hysteria in particular, at a time when the
biological model was the most prominent, and when physicians were trying to explain
psychic disorders physically. His curiosity concerning hysteria was particularly about how
patients who are physically healthy could suffer from severe somatic (bodily) symptoms such
as paralysis. From a scientific point of view, it didn't make sense, and during his training
under Charcot, a neuropathologist at the time, at the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris, Freud's
confusion grew when he saw Charcot hypnotize such hysteric patients and successfully
suggest their symptoms away. Such confusion led Freud to the realization that the line
humans had set between their body as object and mind as subject wasn't as clear as had been
previously assumed.
At first, Freud used hypnosis and suggestion, but he soon realized that not every
patient could be hypnotized and that even if hypnosis worked it would simply work on
resolving the symptoms and not on making the cause of such symptoms appear to the patients
once they are in a waking state. Then moving away from hypnosis and suggestion he
established a new method which came to be known as psychoanalysis. That method starts off
by inviting the patient to make themselves comfortable on the analytic couch with the analyst
sitting behind them and out of their field of vision, and by the analyst assuring the patient of
the session's confidentiality and nonjudgmental attitude. Now relaxed and free from many
sensory impressions, the patient is asked to “freely associate”, to say whatever comes to their
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mind involuntarily, skimming the surface of their consciousness, however irrelevant,
disturbing, unimportant, distressing, or embarrassing it is. In collecting and focusing on this
usually discarded material Freud noticed that there were apparent gaps in the patient's
memories, areas where the connection was broken, and where the patient felt apparent
discomfort at either trying to focus on retrieving such memories or at actually retrieving them
(Freud, 1904, p.1556).
One of Freud's most important concepts, that of repression, sprang from this abovementioned observation. Freud observed how his neurotic patients were mostly leading
“normal” lives up until they were faced with an experience which caused a distressing and
self-contradictory affect or idea to appear, and which they had to quickly forget since it
threatened to collapse their psychic structure. Freud concluded that repression was the force
which caused such forgetfulness in order to avoid the un-pleasure which conscious
knowledge of the repressed would cause. He also concluded that a defensive force, resistance,
was at play in order to protect the repressed material. Resistance works by either completely
blocking the material from reaching consciousness or by distorting it and hence making it
harder to recognize. Consequently, the greater the resistance the greater the distortion.
Symptoms are one of the outcomes of repression when the distressing material is repressed it
is not completely erased, it always finds ways to manifest itself in unusual ways, namely, the
symptoms. Freud then developed what he called “the art of interpretation” in order to make
the pure unconscious repressed material conscious. Psychoanalytic interpretation applied to
all types of free association stretching from the resistances of repressed material mentioned
above to dreams, unexplained bodily symptoms, bungled actions, and slips of the tongue. The
art of interpretation together with the free association provided the basis of the
psychoanalytic technique. The end goal of such a technique was neither merely making the
unconscious completely conscious nor revealing all repressed material, it was rather a
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tackling of the roots of psychological ailments, in the hopes of the symptoms completely
disappearing, meaning, of the practical recovery of the patient’s health (Freud, 1904, p.15579) (Freud, 1924, p.4106).
Although Freud abandoned hypnosis very early on in his psychoanalytic career, it
served as a clue to what would later be one of the main concepts he's associated with, namely
the unconscious. Freud noticed that under hypnosis his patients recalled traumatic
experiences, and immoral, contradictory, or unusual fantasies, which didn't leave memory
traces in their consciousness, but hugely affected their conscious life through neurotic
symptoms. Physicians at the time, as we have mentioned earlier, were explicitly biologically
oriented and a concept such as the unconscious, despite Freud's claims at its scientific nature,
was met with opposition and distrust. For philosophers, on the other hand, the matter was
split, some believed that the mental was merely a phenomenon of consciousness, while
others, most notably Schopenhauer, had long theorized the existence of an unconscious
mental faculty. That being said, Freud felt he was the first to ground the abstract
philosophical concept of the unconscious and make it tangible (Freud, 1924, p.4102-p.4104)
(Freud, 1925, p.4124).
The unconscious comprises, on the one hand, acts which are merely latent, temporarily
unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones and, on the other hand,
processes such as repressed ones, which if they were to become conscious would be bound to
stand out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious processes. (Freud, 1915, p.2996)

The core of the unconscious consists of all kinds of different and contradicting
wishful/instinctual impulses, which all coexist without being influenced by each other since
the system of the unconscious has no regard for reality and is therefore without the concepts
of time and contradiction; it is the realm of the illogical. “There are in this system no
negation, no doubt, no degrees of certainty …. The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless;
i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no
reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the
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system Cs.” (Freud, 1915, p.3009-10) All which is repressed is unconscious, but the
unconscious is not merely the repressed. Further proof of the unconscious is that in everyday
life we often think, feel, and do things that seem to have no conscious motive, and which
might even contrast with our conscious processes; we also wake up remembering dreams that
don't seem to make any sense to us. Before anything enters the unconscious, it has to pass
through a censorship which then decides whether the resistance should keep exerting effort to
repress it or whether it is to be free, not conscious yet, but with the possibility of becoming
conscious at any time. Consciousness is an extremely 'fugitive' state, economically not
everything can stay conscious at the same time, the mind would be overwhelmed, and so, the
preconscious, a derivative of the conscious and the third element of the
conscious/unconscious topography, exists to hold all that has the capability of being called
into consciousness. The preconscious differs slightly from the conscious; the preconscious is
the system which endows the material which is to become conscious with temporality, it
controls the reality testing and hence doesn't allow for contradictory wish fulfillment, and it is
also the container of all conscious memory (Freud, 1915, p.2997-9, p.3010).
The division between Freud's three topographical psychical processes is not
permanent or absolute, we saw that what is preconscious can be made conscious, that what is
unconscious can possibly be made conscious through external, most likely, psychoanalytic
help, in states of psychoses (loss of the reality/imagination barrier), or even in dream states as
we will see later, and that the preconscious can temporarily become unconscious in the cases
of forgetting names and of general slips of the tongue. As for the communication between the
three psychical processes, Freud argues that it is wrong to assume that the preconscious does
all the psychical work while the unconscious rests or that their relationship is merely one of
repression where the preconscious throws its unwanted material in the abyss of the
unconscious. The unconscious is very much alive and active and maintains a relationship of
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cooperation with the preconscious at times (Freud, 1940, p.4970). The unconscious as per our
understanding so far is guarded by resistances that don't allow the repressed material to exit.
The resistance doesn't function when material is flowing in the other direction though. Which
means that the unconscious is often affected by external perceptual experiences. Whether
such external perceptions have the power to cause any change in the unconscious is another
matter. Psychoanalytic treatment is built on the prospect of influencing the unconscious
through conscious processes and proves that despite it being a hard task it's not impossible.
Another unelaborated yet note-worthy observation of Freud's is that the unconscious of one
person can directly react and influence the unconscious of another without such
communication having to pass through the conscious (Freud, 1915, p.3016).
Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively
conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable,
so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the
unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not
necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that the
correction of internal perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the
correction of external perception - that internal objects are less unknowable than the external
world. (Freud, 1915, p.2995)

Freud believes that reality will always remain unknowable to us and that therefore
true knowledge of our psychical apparatus is extremely hard to achieve. Since just like any
other type of knowledge, knowledge of the psychical apparatus is reached through the
medium of the apparatus itself, but that humans nevertheless need to figure out how to apply
a system of inference to themselves, meaning they should try to view their mental processes
objectively, to detach from their subjective conflicts and begin inferring and constructing a
number of unconscious processes that seem to underlie and control their mental life in order
to insert them into conscious processes (Freud, 1915, p.2993).
We assume that mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the
characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several portions - which we
imagine, that is, as resembling a telescope or microscope or something of the kind. (Freud,
1940, p.4957)

Freud was not the first to make this above-mentioned assumption, but he believed that
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the way he worked out the concept was a scientific novelty. According to him philosophers
before him did tackle the concept although only in abstract terms, he argues that the
difference between what he did and what philosophers had always done is that he grounded
philosophical theories in lived experiences, he reached knowledge of this psychical apparatus
through investigating human beings and their individual development (Freud, 1940, p.4957).
The investigation started with the study of the most archaic and obscure province of
the aforementioned psychical apparatus, namely, the id. The id according to Freud forms the
core of our being, it is present at birth, it is our constitution, our temperament, and everything
that is inherited. This implies that the instincts we are born with find their initial formulation
in forms unknown to us (Freud, 1940, p.4957).
The id exists in the realm of the unconscious, it expresses the true purpose of a single
organism's life, which is the satisfaction of its innate needs, and it doesn't give any regard to
keeping the organism alive or protecting it, but soon the human being in whom the id is the
sole ruler has to face the real world, the real world being a myriad of undifferentiated sensory
stimulations threatening to penetrate the subject after that realization. Freud theorizes a
portion of the id has to undergo mandatory development, it has to form a shield to protect
against un-pleasurable stimuli. This new province is thereafter called the ego, the ego not
only acts as a shield from stimuli, it also becomes the intermediary between the id and the
external world, and since it does so it connects between sense perception and muscular
action, which means that it controls all voluntary movement (Freud, 1940 p.4957).
In the course of the id's development some of its contents remain unchanged/innately
present and therefore inaccessible at the core of the unconscious and some are transported
into the preconscious state and therefore absorbed into the ego since the ego has the quality of
being preconscious; the ego could, during its development, decide to return some of its
material to the unconscious id, such acquired id material is what we consider the repressed.
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The ego has the task of self-preservation in the external world, it does so through storing up
experiences about different events and stimuli in the memory, then using such experiences, to
send danger signals to the person by means of anxiety in order to activate flight from
excessively strong stimuli, to cope with moderate stimuli, and to actively bring about
advantageous changes in the external world. In the internal world, on the other hand, it has to
win control over the instinctual urges of the id, it has to decide which instincts would be
appropriate to act on without causing the person acting on them or others harm in the external
world, which instincts are to be acted on immediately, and which should be postponed until
an appropriate time. For this reason, the ego is the faculty in charge of repression. What
guides the ego in its operation of instincts is the amount of tension found in the instinct itself
or caused by it, the rhythm of changes in tension for the ego translates as pleasure and unpleasure, the decrease of tension being pleasure and the increase of it being un-pleasure. The
instincts represent the somatic demands on the mind, and the ultimate cause of any activity,
in themselves they are ungraspable, they can only be known or understood through the ideas
attached to them. Both the ego and the id operate under the pleasure principle (seeking
pleasure/avoiding un-pleasure), in the ego, the operations of such pleasure-seeking are clear
as was just mentioned, in the id, on the other hand, things are more complex. The id, despite
the fact that it is cut off from the external world, has a perceptual realm of its own, which
gives it the ability to acutely detect all its internal changes, especially the fluctuations of the
tension of its instinctual needs, and translate them to our conscious perception as feelings of
pleasure and un-pleasure. It seems that the highest aim of our psychic apparatus is, pleasure, a
state of (Nirvana) which could only happen through the extinction of instinctual needs. The
problem which arises here is that the knowledge available of the id is reached through the
medium of another agency, and although affects (pleasure & un-pleasure) reach us directly
from the unconscious, the ideas and instinctual impulses attached to them remain
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unconscious, which therefore then causes them to attach to conscious substitutive ideas or
aims that determine their future qualitative character. The more we delve into the
unconscious id the more we grasp its illusive contradictory nature (Freud, 1940, p.4957,
p.4973, p.5005).
Freud calls the representation of sexual instincts libido. Sexual instincts for Freud are
much more complex than the need for a genital union between two people, and he
acknowledges that such complexity in the theory of sexuality had been reached before in the
work of Schopenhauer. The instincts in general and the urgency they present themselves with
often gets in the way of self-preservation, they can lead to extreme conflicts with the external
world, and even to extinction, the ego in this case has to often raise its defenses and deny the
sexual instincts any satisfaction causing them to seek satisfaction in indirect ways by either
assuming the unhealthy deflected satisfaction of symptoms, to assume the neutral way and
manifest themselves in dreams, or to assume, through the help of psychoanalysis, the
healthiest satisfaction, namely, sublimation, as we will see later on. Freud based his libido
theory on the assumption that the libido is not originally tied to the outside world but rather to
the person/ego itself, and that only later on after realizing that the outside world satisfies its
vital needs does the libido start flowing to external objects. After that moment the libido
instincts are differentiated from the self-preservative instincts. The ego should ideally act as a
reservoir for the libido from which it can allow for a flow from and to objects. Psychoanalytic
treatment attempts to free the libido from the objects it had previously been bound to for
unconscious reasons and to place said libido at the conscious disposal of the patient (Freud,
1917, p.3609-10) (Freud, 1924, p.4125).
The instinctual stimuli's force comes from within the human mind, and that's what
makes it so difficult to abandon. If one receives unwanted physical stimuli, for example, the
first reaction would be to run or shield oneself from such stimuli until they dissipate. With
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instinctual stimuli, on the other hand, one is incapable of running away from him/herself, one
also realizes that they are a constant force that never dissipates without being satisfied in any
way possible (Freud, 1915, p.2958-9).
Freud narrows down all instincts to two basic instincts, the Eros, the self-preservative,
species preservative instinct which allows for libidinal activities whether self/ego love, or
object love, and whose final goal and striving is to unify, bind, and connect, and the
Thanatos, the destructive instinct whose final goal is to lead all which is living into its
original early inorganic state, and which is therefore also called the death instinct.
During childhood, a relatively long period when the child has to be dependent on its
parents, the ego develops a special agency which internalizes the paternal function, this third
and final province of the structure of Freud's psychic apparatus is called the super-ego. Once
the super-ego emerges and becomes differentiated from the ego it becomes yet another power
the ego has to take into account. A power which harshly judges the ego watches over it and
censors its strivings, ready to punish it at any moment. The super-ego's main function seems
to be the limitation of satisfaction, it is in charge of what we think of as our conscience, it
punishes the ego for actions and un-acted on intentions with equal harshness, through
inducing fear, anxiety, and guilt, the ego then has to constantly find a way to obtain
satisfaction whilst keeping the super-ego content. The ego has the task of simultaneously
satisfying the demands of the super-ego, the id, and reality/the external world, all whilst
reconciling their demands with one another. The relationship between the ego and the superego is fundamentally built on fear and is understood when it is traced back to the child's
relationship with, and attitude towards its parents first and foremost, then less so their
families, teachers, respected social figures, culture, and the social milieu which they
represent. The super-ego as mentioned above is the internalization of the paternal function,
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but it's severity as Freud pointed out is not directly related to the severity of the paternal
figures. If the paternal figures were too strict and punishing during the ego's early years, the
ego, too fearful, realizes it can neither pursue instinctual satisfaction nor appropriately react
to such severity, and therefore internalizes and reflects back the aggression it feels towards
them. If the paternal figures were too permissive on the other hand, the ego realizes it needs
an internal regulatory punitive system and therefore develops a severe super-ego (Freud,
1940, p.4958) (Freud, 1930, p.4519, 4524).
In a way the ego and the super-ego are derived from the id, the id and the super-ego
don't have a direct connection since the ego acts as an intermediate between them, they do
have one thing in common though, both the super-ego and the id represent influences from
the past. The id being the influence of heredity, and the super-ego being the influence of what
has been internalized and taken over from other people during childhood, whereas the ego is
determined by experiences both current and past (Freud, 1940, p.4958).
Freud also saw that it was almost impossible to assign the two basic instincts, Eros
and Thanatos, to one or the other provinces of the mind, they almost never appear in isolation
from each other and it seems to him that both the life and death instincts where available,
fused together, during the time when the ego was not yet differentiated from the id, and that
the Eros preservative instinct might be what precipitated the split in order to neutralize the
destructive tendencies (Freud, 1940, p.4960).
Thus it may in general be suspected that the individual dies of his internal conflicts but that the
species dies of its unsuccessful struggle against the external world if the latter changes in a
fashion which cannot be adequately dealt with by the adaptations which the species has
acquired. (Freud, 1940, p.4961)

The death instinct comes to our attention when its destruction is directed outwardly.
Before the formation of the super-ego and if the super-ego is too weak, the death instinct
threatens to destroy the external world. What the super-ego does is that it fixates a substantial
amount of the aggressiveness of the death instinct unto the ego and hence operates as a self45

destructive instinct. It again falls on the ego to find a way for some discharge of destructivity
without disturbing the external world and to protect the psychic apparatus from internal
destruction. Unlike the death instinct, the life instinct's functions start from the inside out.
The life instinct's libido seems to be stored up in the ego where the instant of the self/world
separation happens and when the possibility of self-love occurs, and it is only after the
occurrence of self-love is object/other love possible (Freud, 1940, p.4961).
There can be no mention of Freud without his work on dreams, dreams as Freud
argued are 'the royal road to the knowledge of the unconscious', they are the best indication of
dynamics of the unconscious. The concept of dream work very briefly is that during sleep the
defenses of the ego are weakened and the repressed unconscious material starts surfacing.
The ego possibly considers this a compromise, an act of compliance to the id that doesn't
allow for the resistance to completely subside, therefore the material is usually a disguised
fulfillment of repressed wishes. The dreams in a way resemble the neurotic symptoms in their
structure, they, like the symptoms, appear nonsensical at first glance but once subjected to
free association and interpretation, we are lead to their hidden meaning. A dream is therefore
also a harmless useful temporary madness which can easily be terminated through an active
act of will by the subject at any time, and after which psychic functions can resume normally
(Freud, 1940, p.4980-82).
Psychoanalysis, Freud believed was the first to point out a weakness in our repressive
psychic and cultural systems; he believed that there should be a reduction in the severity with
which we disavow and repress our instincts and that there was an immense need for a new
system of truthfulness where the repression of certain instinctual impulses is replaced with
the much better and more reliable sublimation (Freud, 1924, p.4128). As is clear by now,
repression is a subjugation of the immoral side of humanity, usually sexual, aggressive, or
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selfish impulses, it results from either facing such forbidden and crude impulses from the
external world (trauma), or facing them from within (fantasies). Repression is considered an
incomplete subjugation though since the repressed impulses always find a way of expressing
themselves as symptoms and in extreme cases causing debilitating illness. The repressed
finds expression in symptoms because the instinctual impulses eventually always get their
satisfaction, repression also requires a great expenditure of psychic energy and its removal
would result in a saving of energy from an economic point of view (Freud, 1924, p.4106).
The aesthetic appreciation of works of art and the elucidation of the artistic gift are, it is true,
not among the tasks set to psycho-analysis. But it seems that psycho-analysis is in a position to
speak the decisive word in all questions that touch upon the imaginative life of man. (Freud,
p.4117, 1924)

The imagination in Freud represents the freedom from repression, it protects the
Idea/id which it is committed to. Through having access to the ego, imagination is capable of
transporting material from the unconscious to consciousness through the act of creating art.
After transcending its illusory nature, knowledge of the imagination alone is capable of “the
surmounting of the antagonistic human reality” (Marcuse, 1955, p.140-143). The imagination
has the power to reconcile and portray the contradictory unconscious/id without facing
resistance from the ego. In Schopenhauerian terms, the imagination allows the chaotic
universal will to be an object of our perception through the Idea.
There emerges from time to time in the creations and fabrics of the genius of dreams a depth
and intimacy of emotion, a tenderness of feeling, a clarity of vision, a subtlety of observation,
and a brilliance of wit such as we should never claim to have at our permanent command in
our waking lives. There lies in dreams a marvellous poetry, an apt allegory, an incomparable
humour, a rare irony. A dream looks upon the world in a light of strange idealism and often
enhances the effects of what it sees by its deep understanding of their essential nature. It
pictures earthly beauty to our eyes in a truly heavenly splendour and clothes dignity with the
highest majesty, it shows us our everyday fears in the ghastliest shape and turns our
amusement into jokes of indescribable pungency. (Freud, 1900, p.570)

Freud claimed that art and philosophy can be interpreted as dreams, that it is possible
for psychoanalysis to detect the path leading from the instinctual unconscious wish to the
work of art, to detect the emotional impact the work of art leaves on the observer, and to
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detect both the affinity and difference between the artist and the madman (neurotic). While
dreams, art, and philosophy project the results of unconscious functioning, psychoanalysis
reflects such projection inwards towards self-understanding. (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.286)
The artist's ability to project his unconscious material could be the reason why Freud
associated the artist with the madman. Like the madman, the artist does not repress his
unconscious affects and instinctual impulses. Another affinity the artist has to the madman is
also the fact that they both see the world for its truth, they both see the suffering and fear
which permeates it. The complete withdrawal of the ego would mean chaos, nothing would
stand in the face of the ravenous unconscious id’s instincts, but in the artists, a letting go of
the control of the ego is required in order for the unconscious to be able to show itself (a
letting go of the individual will in Schopenhauerian terms). The difference between the artist
and the madman resides in the artist's ability to sublimate. Through his strong power of
reflection, the artist is able to project all he has before his eyes, and for that to occur, the
previously unconsciously repressed has to be made conscious, to be accepted, and to be
integrated into our scheme of perception. So, although both artist and madman have an issue
with repression, the artist is able to find an outlet for the material meant for repression (Freud,
1924, p.4117).
Psychoanalysis has been explicitly concerned with the question of art since Freud
realized, as early as 1910 in Leonardo Da Vinci And A Memory Of His Childhood that he
couldn't write about human conscious and unconscious experiences without writing about art.
“Another path led from the investigation of dreams to the analysis of works of imagination
and ultimately to the analysis of their creators - writers and artists themselves” (Freud, 1914,
p.2902). Since then the tradition of exploring art has lived on in psychoanalysis and has been
inherited by many other traditions (e.g. the modern art therapy schools). Earlier we
mentioned that Sublimation was the healthiest form of instinctual satisfaction. Psychoanalysis
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discovered that there was an aspect of creative mental work that attends to the fulfillment of
long-repressed wishes without meeting any frustration from the external world. Freud
believed that the myths, works of imaginative writing, and of art had a strong yet
incomprehensible connection to the unconscious. For that reason, psychoanalysts since the
time of Freud have been interested in works of literature, art, and the psychology of artists.
“Fate can do little against one”, in whom the yield of pleasure from artistic, psychical, and
intellectual work is heightened (Freud, 1930, p.4479). Such a claim is similar to the
resignation in the face of tragedy which Schopenhauer associates with the denial of the willto-live achieved through art. During the process of sublimation, the instincts, now known to
have the ability to readily change their object at the hopes of satisfaction, allow themselves
redirection from their original aims, thus allowing their energy to be at the disposal of the
'cultural development', and in that act of redirection most of the significant cultural
achievements are reached. Sublimation for Freud could have been very possibly forced upon
the instincts by civilization (Freud, 1924, p.4116-25) (Freud, 1930, p.4494). Freud was faced
with a lot of critique when suggesting that our highest cultural achievements and our ability
for fine art which we pride ourselves in as a species is the outcome of the redirection of the
same crude and 'animalistic' urges that we denounce and have no wish of being reminded of
(Freud, 1924, p.4125).
Substitutive satisfaction provided by art is according to Freud an illusion, but one
which is psychically effective and enjoyable due to the role of phantasy/imagination in
mental life. Art is capable of causing us to withdraw from the pressure of our instincts and the
un-pleasure of the external world, but Freud doesn't believe it's strong enough to make us
forget real misery. When the ego was developing its sense of reality, the imagination was
absolved from the obligations of the reality-testing, it was set apart as the agency through
which the fulfillment of difficult wishes could be carried out. The fact that the imagination
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doesn't go through reality testing and ties it to the unconscious and hence places art under the
dominion of psychoanalysis. The artist finds happiness in giving his phantasies body, it is a
satisfaction objectively less intense than those of the crude impulses, but it does, oddly
enough, offer the artist and the observer an adequate refined form of satisfaction. Through the
power of the artist, works of art are enjoyed by those who aren't creative themselves (Freud,
1930, p.4474-80).
Finally, psychoanalysis demands a distinction between the knowledge of the analyst
and that of the patient. The analyst doesn't tell the patient what she has discovered about his
psyche right after she acquires such knowledge. The analyst's knowledge is put off until the
moment the patient seems to be about to make the same discovery himself, if the analyst is
too hasty in giving interpretations, the information would either provoke extreme resistance
causing further repression or it could threaten to stop analysis altogether. The mode in which
the patients gain knowledge about themselves is of great significance and will be discussed
later. In the face of the ego's forces fighting against itself, repression, un-pleasure at laying
itself open, guilt arising of its relationship with the super-ego, and the satisfaction of instincts
the illness provides, the patient's capacity for instinct sublimation and transcendence, as well
as the patient's relative intellectual powers are the constituting factors to whether the patient
has favorable or unfavorable prognosis (Freud, 1940, p.4988-9).
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Chapter 5: Freud and Schopenhauer's Philosophy

You may perhaps shrug your shoulders and say: ‘That isn’t natural science, it’s
Schopenhauer’s philosophy!’ But, Ladies and Gentlemen, why should not a bold thinker have
guessed something that is afterwards confirmed by sober and painstaking detailed research?
(Freud, 1933, p.4711)

Schopenhauer's influence on Freud is undeniable, its extent on the other hand is
debatable. We know Freud had a great deal of respect for Schopenhauer's thought and that he
himself recognized many similarities in their theories. This chapter will start with presenting
the most prominent similarities in Schopenhauer and Freud's thought and as we move on it
will get to other less obvious similarities, all whilst demonstrating why Freud believed his
work grounded Schopenhauer's thought in the experience of individuals.
Probably very few people can have realized the momentous significance for science and life of
the recognition of unconscious mental processes. It was not psycho-analysis, however, let us
hasten to add, which first took this step. There are famous philosophers who may be cited as
forerunners - above all the great thinker Schopenhauer, whose unconscious ‘Will’ is
equivalent to the mental instincts of psycho-analysis. (Freud,1917, p.3615)

Many of those who investigated the relationship between Freud and Schopenhauer
such as, R. K.Gupta (1975), D. W. Hamlyn (1988), Young and Brook (1994), and Robert
Grimwade (2011), amongst many others, claimed that Schopenhauer's will was parallel to
Freud's id, that they were both ravenous blind raging forces unknown/unconscious to us
which nevertheless held complete control over us.
Hamlyn saw that if we employ our intellect in investigating our psychic nature we are
bound to conjure a theoretical need for a hidden powerful aspect of the psyche since
consciousness can't account for everything (Hamlyn, 1988, p.5-6). Gupta also claimed that
Freud's beliefs concerning the human condition were aligned with Schopenhauer's general
concepts. He saw that the will and the id are both irrational, that they only act or wish, and
that they are concerned with satisfying their needs at any price, to the extent that they
wouldn't even care about the survival of the individual in whom they present themselves. He
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said that there was never enough satisfaction to quench their thirst, that both their desire
systems rely on alternating tension and relief. (Gupta, 1975, p.722-723). Grimwade also saw
that Freud and Schopenhauer shared a common world view and had similar philosophical
affinities. He pointed at both their pessimistic views regarding the power of human intellect
and reason in the face of powerful conflicting unconscious forces, and regarding human
nature in general, and that they both claimed mental illness was a disorder of the memory
(Grimwade, 2011, p.149).
Gupta does mention a fundamental difference between the will and the id, which is
that the id is individual while the will is general and to be found everywhere, and that the
will, once objectified, brings its survival force with it, while the id needs the ego for
protection (Gupta, 1975, p.723). I believe a distinction, which hasn't been addressed in any of
the previous studies, needs to be made between the free all-encompassing world-will and the
will objectified in the individual. The one all-encompassing will shared by everyone should
rightly be equated with the Freudian unconscious. Considered from the view of
consciousness they are both illogical, both follow an obscure system where good and evil are
meaningless, both don't follow the laws of contradiction, are free of doubt, morality,
negation, and are timeless. Although the will and the id share a great many similarities, like
those of acting on pleasurable instincts, being a body of unconscious drives, being timeless,
and irrational, the id is merely a province in the individual's psychic apparatus, one that is
there from the very first second of the individual life. The unconscious reflects itself and
communicates through the id up until the psychic apparatus is alerted, through the
preservative instinct Eros, that the individual in which it resides would perish if left to the
blind force of the unconscious and is in need of preservation; from there arises the ego which
is first and foremost a self-preservative province. So, if there is a great deal of similarity
between the id and the world-will it is because the id is unconscious.
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We could probably also rightly equate the id with the Schopenhauerian Idea, the Idea
being the highest and clearest objectification of the will, one that does not function under the
principle of sufficient reason and therefore could not have the qualities of space, temporality,
and causality, but which nevertheless has the quality of being object for a subject as it is
already individuated in a subject; the same applies to the id, it shares almost all the
characteristics of the unconscious, and like the unconscious it doesn't follow the laws of
reason or logic, but it has the quality of being object for a subject, of being a part of the
individual's mental apparatus. It could be argued that the id is dynamic while the Idea is not,
but just as the id is part of a dynamic unconscious, the Idea is the clearest representation of
the dynamic will and therefore is obligated to have the will's chaos and activity represented
through it. The unconscious and the universal will/thing-in-itself are exclusively approached
through our arduously reached knowledge of the id/Idea. It could even be speculated that it
was through such objectification of the will/unconscious into the id/Idea that the Eros
preservative instincts were able to gain ground on the Thanatos destructive instincts and form
the ego. The individual will in this case should therefore be equated with the ego, they are
both the product of the individuation of an all-encompassing force. They both aim at the
preservation and protection of the individual from the external world and from its internal
conflicts alike. The forms of sufficient reason apply to the ego and the individual will, giving
them control over conceptual and logical knowledge and authority over the individual's
decisions regarding what is considered safe and what is not, which humans are to be
considered trustworthy and even potentially helpful, and which excitations are to be allowed
into consciousness and which aren't, in most cases at least, as we shall see later.
The large extent to which psychoanalysis coincides with the philosophy of Schopenhauer - not
only did he assert the dominance of the emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality but
he was even aware of the mechanism of repression - is not to be traced to my acquaintance
with his teaching. I read Schopenhauer very late in my life. (Freud, 1925b, p.4234)
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Robert Grimwade Mentioned in, Between the quills: Schopenhauer and Freud on
sadism and masochism, that Freud was alive at a time when Kant's and Schopenhauer's works
were on 'every bourgeois coffee-table', so despite Freud's claims at not having read
Schopenhauer before coming up with his theories, Schopenhauer's thought was in the
immediate consciousness around him (Grimwade, 2011, p.168). Many, such as Young and
Brook (1994) have investigated whether Freud was earnest in his claims of having not read
Schopenhauer earlier in his life or whether he wasn't. Although inconclusive, through tracing
young Freud's philosophical influences, the literary trends at the time he was in university,
and the “curiously ambivalent” pattern of his mentions of Schopenhauer, Young and Brook
(1995) concluded that the similarities couldn't have possibly been confined to cultural
influence. Such investigations, for the purpose of this thesis merely shed light on the
difficulty of tangibly tracing Freud's work to Schopenhauer. What remains clear to us is the
uncanny similarity between their doctrines.
Freud equated health with true knowledge of the self which requires a disavowal of
our usual mode of knowledge and leads to an avoidance of future maladies, as he articulated:
You behave like an absolute ruler who is content with the information supplied him by his
highest officials and never goes among the people to hear their voice. Turn your eyes inward,
look into your own depths, learn first to know yourself! Then you will understand why you
were bound to fall ill; and perhaps, you will avoid falling ill in future. (Freud, 1917, p.3614)

After Freud came out with his psychoanalytic theory and technique, and especially
after he developed the complete structure of his psychical apparatus, he was met with a lot of
denial and opposition. He believed that such strong denial and opposition was due to
psychoanalysis being a huge injury to man's narcissism, the fact that the ego is not master in
its own house, that the ego could extend beyond the individual, that some force he is unaware
of controls the experiences he thinks he consciously engages in, that the mental does not
coincide with the conscious, that the apparently most trivial and obscure mental functions can
have a repressed meaning and causation, and that symptoms were substitutive satisfactions,
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was a tough pill to swallow by most. What is conscious is usually enough to cover a person's
basic needs, which, more often than not, helps maintain the illusion that one knows all that
one could possibly know, the deficit starts to make an appearance through instinctual
conflicts. At this time the illusion of consciousness breaks and 'the will extends no further '
than what is known, the ego realizes that knowledge reaches it through untrustworthy and
incomplete perceptions. Freud also compared this narcissistic injury to both, the biological
blow man received when the wall of superiority he had set up between himself and other
creatures was destroyed through Darwin's theory of evolution, and the cosmological
Copernican blow when man discovered that the universe doesn't revolve around him/the
earth. It was in the same paper A difficulty in The Path of Psychoanalysis where Freud spoke
of the affective difficulty humans encounter in attempting to understand psychoanalysis and
of Schopenhauer taking the first step into knowledge of the unconscious that he spoke of how
Copernicus' discovery was already made long before Copernicus' time. That fact didn't stop it
from being the Copernican discovery, so it is probably correct to assume that Freud felt the
same way about Schopenhauer's influence. Freud believed he became deserving of his
discovery once he tied his name to it. He acknowledged the fact that Schopenhauer made the
same discovery before him, but given the scientific paradigm he tied himself to, he believed,
as we saw in the first quote in this chapter, that through 'sober pain-staking and detailed
research' he elevated Schopenhauer's discovery from the passive abstractness he associated
philosophy with, into the active evidence-based realm of science. Philosophy, unable to reach
any deep self or world understanding, resorts to the imagination to create meaning. This for
Freud means that any understanding of the unconscious in philosophy, or in our case that
Schopenhauer offers, is a mere wishful speculation (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.281). Freud
didn't settle for merely making a discovery and sharing it with mankind. Injuring/helping
mankind with his discovery required force and the ability to withstand the backlash of the
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injured, something Freud didn't believe philosophy was capable of. That's why he claimed
that while he was being attacked and rejected Schopenhauer was looked at with respect and
reverence for making the same discoveries. (Freud, 1924, p.4107) (Freud, 1925, p.4129)
(Freud, 1917, p.3614-15).
If such a sorrow, such painful knowledge or reflection, is so harrowing that it becomes
positively unbearable, and the individual would succumb to it, then nature alarmed in this way
seizes on madness as the last means of saving life. The mind, tormented so greatly, destroys as
it were the thread of its memory, fills up the gap with fictions, and thus seeks refuge in
madness from the mental suffering that exceeds its strength, just as a limb affected by
mortification is cut off and replaced with a wooden one … (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 193)

Another similarity between Freud and Schopenhauer is in their explanation of
madness and its relationship to repression. Schopenhauer focused on the psychic origin of
madness whilst acknowledging its possible somatic causes, and also acknowledging the great
characteristic similarity and intertwining of the psychic and the somatic in madness, how a
psychic pain can appear as a bodily discomfort and vice versa. He theorized that madness
occurs when the thread of the memory breaks, but the mind distorts and modifies it enough,
so it appears whole. He summed it up by saying “we can regard the origin of madness as a
violent “casting out of one’s mind” of something” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.401). For the said
casting out to occur, a setting in, of something else has to occur, which is what Schopenhauer
speculated happened in most cases; he also spoke of the rarer 'reverse process', where the
mind is fixated on, sets in, one thought, while casting out all others. This reverse process
happens in cases of trauma (sudden frightful occurrences), or love frustration (a longing for a
person or an object) (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.401). We can already equate the first case where
the casting out of one's mind and setting in of something else occurs with Freud's theory of
repression, which states, as we have already seen, that if the mind is faced with unwanted,
contradicting, or disturbing material, it represses such material into the unconscious out of
conscious reach and the resistance replaces such material with potential symptoms. As for the
second case of fixation, Freud too speculated that the only experiences strong enough to
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break through the ego defenses were traumatic excitations. When the traumatic excitations
are too intense, the ego defenses cease to work, and the mental apparatus gets flooded with
stimulus hence fixating on the unwanted experiences. (Freud, 1924, p.4106)
In both cases mentioned above the sure sign of madness is when a person cannot trust
their perception, when they are unsure of whether their recollections are true or not.
Schopenhauer made sure to differentiate between this inadequacy in reality testing, and
between the inability to tell whether a recollection was a mere dream, which in this case
wouldn't be a sign of madness. The madman can, on some occasions, think properly, or even
have creative ideas (flashes of wit), but he can never be trusted when it comes to past
perceptual recollections (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.401).
Every new adverse event must be assimilated by the intellect, in other words, must receive a
place in the system of truths connected with our will and its interests, whatever it may have to
displace that is more satisfactory. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.400)

Humans as we have already seen, relate all their perceptions and experiences to their
individual will/ego, and therefore when something happens which causes a stirring of the
will, whether through causing un-pleasure, wounding the ego, or interfering with wishes, they
tend to not be able to view such interferences objectively or to investigate them properly.
What the will chooses to do in the face of such inconvenient interferences is to,
'unconsciously sneak off from them', while putting more attention on remembering
pleasurable sensations. If the human is faced with events the will is completely unable to
bear, the assimilation or modification of memory threads carried out by the will fails, and
whole events or memories are suppressed beyond the intellect's grasp. The intellect renounces
its nature for the sake of protecting the will's pleasure. “In this resistance on the part of the
will to allow what is contrary to it to come under the examination of the intellect is to be
found the place where madness can break in on the mind.” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.400)
Mentioned is another point of similarity between Freud and Schopenhauer. Despite the fact
that Freud believed he was the first to tackle the inadequacy of the repressive forces in the
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face of blind satisfaction seeking instincts, he believed that in connecting resistance with
memory lapses he was separating himself from the philosophical tradition. (Freud, 1914,
p.2885) We see here that Schopenhauer thinks of the repressive forces as the doorway to
madness, and as we have seen and will see later, they both choose to solve the problem of
repression through art. Freud solves it through sublimating the instincts meant for repression,
and Schopenhauer through turning away from the individual will and the instincts that exist
under its dominion.
When Schopenhauer spoke of the artist as the mirror of mankind, bringing to its
consciousness everything it does and feels, he meant that the artist, being in a state of pure
knowing, has given up his consciousness for the sake of letting his intellect roam free of the
laws and relations of the will in order to mirror the objective world. On the one hand freeing
the intellect means things cease to be perceived in their relations, it means the forms and
colors of things appear in their true essence, on the other hand it has implications for the
person who's 'goaded by no willing' (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.249) (Schopenhauer, 1966,
P.373).
The similarity between the madman and the artist for Schopenhauer resides in the fact
that for both the madman and the genius the intellect is separated from the will. If the will
sees everything in relation, it's with the aim of preserving the individual, so it makes sense
that once the will loses control over the individual, and with the blind world-will in charge,
that the human/artist, now interested in the theoretical and the objective, ignores all that is
personal and practical and almost stops paying attention to their welfare. The freeing of the
intellect also means that the artist becomes more sensitive and susceptible to feeling all
emotions in their fullness, to lacking the coolness and sobriety of the rational man guided by
his will, all whilst feeling a prevailing melancholy that results from seeing the world in its
true essence, namely suffering. Now such high sensitivity, lack of rationality, and inclination
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to mood swings, all cause the artist to live in isolation from the rest of humanity. It is difficult
for others to accept him and for him to find anyone similar to himself (Schopenhauer, 1966,
p.384-385, p.389). For Freud, as we have seen in chapter four, the similarity between the
artist and the madman resides in the fact that, like Schopenhauer's artist he is free from the
pressure of the ego's resistance and repressive forces giving him the ability, like the madman,
to project unconscious material. In moving away from the ego's control, Freud's artist has to
live with the weakening of the preservative instincts that come with such control, and
therefore like Schopenhauer's artist is left vulnerable to the effects of external and internal
stimulus.
With them it is willing, with him it is knowing, that prevails; hence their joys and pleasures are
not his, nor his theirs. They are only moral beings, and have merely personal relations; he is at
the same time a pure intellect that as such belongs to the whole of mankind. (Schopenhauer,
1966, p.390)

The difference for Schopenhauer between the madman and the genius is that the
separation of intellect from the will in the man of genius is caused by excess of the
knowledge of the essence of things, while for the mad man on the other hand, the will
withdraws itself from the governing of knowledge and of all motives. The result of madness
is that the will moves blindly and destroys everything in its way while the result of genius is
that the artist reflects such blind will as he sees it. In the genius the will’s induced violence is
softened by awareness, by the light of metaphysical knowledge. Such knowledge in the face
of great tragedy, the most intense exhibition of the ruthlessness of the will, for example,
sends the individual into a state of resignation, a denial of the will-to-live, which
Schopenhauer believes is a road to salvation. Freud makes a similar distinction between the
artist and the madman. For him the madman is controlled by either the blind forces of the
unconscious id or the symptoms resulting from inadequate repression. What differentiates the
artist is his power of reflection, the ability to suppress instead of repress exhibited in the
conscious awareness of the instincts that need to be sublimated, satisfied in a way which
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doesn't meet any resistance from the internal and external world.
Schopenhauer claims that there is a great deal of similarity between the artist and the
child as well, in both there is a great deal of energy directed at mental activity, for the child
it's because of its developmental nature while for the genius it's because of the excess in
intellect (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.393). He claims the similarity between them could also be
caused by the fact that, as opposed to normal adults, they both are driven by intellect, the
brain, and are not occupied with sexual instincts, the will's/ego's needs, and therefore have
more time and mental capacity for theoretical work. They both view the world from the point
of knowing and not that of willing, they view it as something strange, exciting, 'a drama', and
therefore with objective eyes (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.394-395). “The relationship between
the two shows itself primarily in the naivety and sublime ingenuousness that are a
fundamental characteristic of true genius.” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p.395) Psychoanalysis
would agree with such a statement to an extent, given the fact that the artist sublimates the
sexual instincts amongst other such as violence.
To make the matter clear, let us compare our consciousness to a sheet of water of some depth.
Then the distinctly conscious ideas are merely the surface; on the other hand, the mass of the
water is the indistinct, the feelings, the after-sensation of perceptions and intuitions and what
is experienced in general, mingled with the disposition of our own will that is the kernel of our
inner nature. (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.135)

Although Freud believed he was alone in his call for critical self-reflection, in his call
for caution at accepting anything our faculty of reason offers without attempting to
understand what lay behind it, Schopenhauer's formulation of the unconscious in that quote
could easily pass as a quote by Freud. Schopenhauer gave examples of the desires we hide
from ourselves in order to uphold a positive image we may have of ourselves, and of the
wishes we don't know we have until they are fulfilled. He even alluded at a dynamic
unconscious, saying that the intellect cannot “penetrate into the secret workshop of the will’s
decisions” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.210), and that all our perceptions and the judgments we
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consciously make are a result of an automatic unconscious process “in the deep obscure
depths of the mind” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.136).
The human generally, being an objectification of the will, has access to the inner
nature of things through consciousness of his own inner-self (not to be confused with the
relative-self). As we have already seen, such self-knowledge is not an easy task; we cannot
grasp the essence of things through the Ideas alone or through any seemingly objective
knowledge for that matter, and even if we get past the objective perception we are then faced
with the harder task of getting past our own individual will, eliminating all willing
(Schopenhauer, 1966, p.364). In our immediate perception of the world we almost always
view things in relation to ourselves/our individual will, and therefore we only perceive them
relatively and not in their absolute essence or existence. The will with all its emotions and
passion has a tendency to falsify our knowledge, we tend to base our judgments, our
decisions of aversion and affection, and even our original perceptions of things on mere
preferences. Such limiting relative perception doesn't just apply to objects, it applies to our
perception of other humans, as well as our perception of ourselves, and Schopenhauer
believes that such a relative mode of perception is not only the involuntary norm for humans
but also is the only available form of perception for some (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.372-373).
A task such as eliminating willing cannot arise from a conscious act of the will itself,
even if we consciously make such a decision, its main force is beyond our control. Since our
consciousness is split into self-consciousness, consciousness of our individual will, and
consciousness of the world, consciousness of all other perceptual experiences and
apprehensions, it makes sense that a turning away from the will would involve the latter type
of consciousness. “Accordingly, the consciousness of other things, or knowledge of
perception, becomes the more perfect, in other words the more objective, the less conscious
of ourselves we are during it” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.367). Through introspective self61

observation we can easily come to the realization that the more pressing one of the two types
of our consciousness is, the more the other withdraws. As we have already discussed,
focusing on the object and detaching from the subject creates a state of pure perception, a
pure will-less knowing, whether through encounters with the sublime or through a strong,
solely perceptual, excitation of the brain, the turning away from the will becomes possible
and objects present themselves with clarity and distinctness. We come to apprehend the
universal will in things as well as in ourselves. Our consciousness then becomes almost the
mere channel through which the perceived objects appear as representations, in such a state
we can no longer tell whether we, as individuals, belong to the world or not (Schopenhauer,
1966, p.367-368).
When Schopenhauer spoke of representations falling under the principle of sufficient
reason, through time, space, and causality, he claimed that we had to eradicate our individual
subjective knowledge in order to become pure subjects of knowledge. If we didn’t have our
bodies, which are concrete willing as our modes of perception, we would have been able to
grasp the true nature of the thing-in-itself unclouded by individuality. In the Freudian context
the ego is the obstacle in the individual's way towards pure knowing/ knowledge of the
unconscious. The ego employs the intellect in the service of the pleasure principle in the same
way that knowledge exists for the service of the individual will. The human is capable of
salvation from such servitude through the fine arts; Schopenhauer describes it as a moment
were the subject’s individuality ceases, where they stop perceiving the world through viewing
the object in relation to themselves but rather when the boundaries between perceiver and
perceived, blur and the human becomes a mirror to the object. Only then is he able to turn
away from the individual will.
In Civilization and its Discontents Freud speaks of an 'oceanic feeling', meaning a
feeling of overwhelming unity with the world, a dissolution of the ego and becoming one
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with the external world as a whole. This concept of a fleeting oceanic feeling which
encapsulates our relationship with the external world may sound odd in the context of Freud's
concept of the psyche, but Freud argues that the ego does not have as clear boundaries as we
would like to think, for psychoanalysis had already discovered that the ego extends inwardly
into the unconscious, and that in certain pathological cases (psychosis) the boundary between
the ego and the world becomes unclear (Freud, 1930, p.4465-6).
The ego originally included everything but with the passage of time and being
exposed to un-pleasurable experiences it detaches itself from the external world and what we
are left with later on are only the shriveled remains of the once intimate feeling and allinclusive bond the ego and the world had. The healthiest state the mature ego could attain, for
Freud, is a state of mobility where it is free to extend to objects and retract back into the
subject. When the oceanic feeling comes about, it is there as a reminder what once was and of
what could be, a time without individuation. Freud also connected the oceanic feeling to
states of meditation and mystical rituals where the fixation on bodily sensation, thought and
breath regulation, can cause new sensations of selfhood and a regression into the earlier state
of ego extension. For many people this originary feeling of oneness exists on equal footing
with their mature demarcated ego feeling, for those people the oceanic feeling of
limitlessness and of a bond with the universe is much easier to come about. Although Freud
claimed that art is one of the few things which could induce the oceanic feeling, he didn't go
into the details of such a process, or whether he had in mind the artist when he wrote about
those who experience a high originary feeling of oneness (Freud, 1930, p.4467-8, p.4472).
Freud viewed psychoanalysis as an affirmation of Schopenhauer's theories on
unconscious processes, repression, and the importance of the sexual instincts in the life of
man; that being said, an important distinction between Schopenhauer and Freud's views is in
the highest form of 'salvation', that is, the solution, according to each to the problem of being;
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for Schopenhauer as we have already seen, it's the denial of the will to live, the turning away
from the individual will, while for Freud, it's the regulation of instincts and moving towards
civilization. “What we call happiness in the strictest sense comes from the (preferably
sudden) satisfaction of needs which have been dammed up to a high degree, and it is from its
nature only possible as an episodic phenomenon.” (Freud, 1930, p.4475) Schopenhauer
speaks of desire in the same way, if a situation which originally caused pleasure is prolonged,
the pleasure turns into mild contentment, it is our fate to feel pleasure in a contrast and very
rarely from a state of things, our happiness is restricted by our constitution. With the passage
of time and the increase of un-pleasurable encounters with the external world, man's idea of
happiness stops being the pursuit of pleasure and starts to be the mere avoidance of unpleasure. Freud recommends that we seek happiness through becoming members of the
human community and through working for the good of humanity against nature, subjugating
it to the human will; but he also believes that we can reach happiness through complete
isolation, a turning away from the world and from the inner instinctual needs, that such
happiness would then be the happiness of quietness. All that being said, when it comes to
happiness Freud believes that each human must find the particular way in which they can be
'saved' (Freud, 1930, p.4475-76, p.4482). Freud claims that after man discovers the immense
danger of the immediate satisfaction of instinctual needs and after the fear and frustration of
the external world leads him into a struggle with reality, he discovers that he would be safer
amongst others who wish to renounce/repress their instinctual needs, and from there arose
civilization (Freud, 1924, p.4128).
This aesthetic attitude to the goal of life offers little protection against the threat of suffering,
but it can compensate for a great deal. The enjoyment of beauty has a peculiar, mildly
intoxicating quality of feeling. Beauty has no obvious use; nor is there any clear cultural
necessity for it. Yet civilization could not do without it. (Freud, 1930, p.4481)

There is a particular type of happiness humans feel when beauty, in all its forms, is
presented to their judgment. The artist’s capacity to anticipate the beautiful and create it, and
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the receiver’s ability to recognize beauty upon seeing it with no previous reference is proof
for Schopenhauer that humans, understood beyond their individual will, are the essence of the
will. Investigating beauty and its appreciation was an elusive task for Freud but he concluded
that it must be derived from the field of sexual feelings, he thought it was a perfect example
of how an impulse could be inhibited in its aim/sublimated. Almost no one could write off
beauty as a triviality despite it not serving any real use in the immediate survival of the
human, it is one of the cornerstones of civilization (Freud, 1930, p.4481, 4491).
If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for internal
reasons - becomes inorganic once again - then we shall be compelled to say that ‘the aim of
life is death’ and, looking backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed before living ones. (Freud,
1920, P.3740)

The difference between Freud's and Schopenhauer's routes to salvation has just been
addressed. Freud didn't believe a turning away from life was either the solution to the
problem of being, or the aim of the will. What Freud didn't take into account though was his
concept of the destructive death instinct, the instinct which calls for a return to our earlier
inorganic nature, meaning death, an instinct which he believed had the preservative instincts
working at its service in order to follow the path to death on its own terms. Jacquette explains
existence according to Schopenhauer as “a constant process of dying and a momentary
postponement of ongoing death” (Jacquette, 1999, p.294), which, to me, sounds a lot like
Freud's formulation life as the mere dying on our own terms. Now although Young and
Brook claimed that Schopenhauer never accounted for a death drive because for him the
inevitability of death was bad enough without assuming humans sought death (1994).
Grimwade also pointed out that there was no equivalent to the death instinct in
Schopenhauer's work, claiming that Schopenhauer's will always wills itself, always wills life,
and that even if Schopenhauer allowed for a few of its outward manifestations he certainly
didn't account for the 'death instinct proper' (2011, p.153). In my opinion, Schopenhauer
never had to account for a death drive because his universal will, just like the unconscious, in
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which the Eros and the death instinct coexist, is to its core, all inclusive, chaotic, and capable
of holding contradictions possibly beyond our conception. Just as the blind world-will,
objectified in the subject, as phenomena, appears as will to life, the unconscious, individuated
in the subject's psychic apparatus, appears as Eros. The will bears its destructive nature in
internal and external conflicts alike, the will's fabric is as disturbed when man is subjugating
man, nature, and animals for his pleasure and survival, as when man is conflicted between
internal opposing desires and drives. It is exactly this destructive force of the will which is
associates with art and draws us to the sublime raging forces in nature, to the ugly, painful
and disturbing in art, and to tragedy and music (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 354).
Freud never wrote that the unconscious is the fabric of being, like Schopenhauer did
with the will, partly because he was too concentrated on the experience of the individual, and
partly because such a notion would have been unlikely to cross his mind. That doesn't mean
he didn’t speculate or note his amazement on the phenomena of one unconscious affecting
another without any conscious awareness from both parties. In the creation of art especially,
the artist communicates how, as a pure subject of knowledge, he reflects his, and the world’s
inner nature. Such knowledge is possible to communicate for Freud due to the unconscious
intercourse possible between humans. For Schopenhauer it is because once the subject of
aesthetic contemplation falls in a state of pure perception, the will becomes objectified in the
artist and the receiver alike, it recognizes itself in them.
As we have seen in chapter four, the unconscious, despite not being able to
communicate ideas because of repression, is still able to communicate affects. Now since
Schopenhauer and Freud both agreed that the genuine work of art proceeds from an
instinctive necessity/moment of inspiration which produces material that could seem foreign
to the artist's own ego, and since the process of art entails a weakening of resistance, much
like dreams. It's fair to say that a lot of the artist's unconscious affective content is able to
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show itself. Therefore, art offers a platform where unconscious communication is possible.
As a result, art is concerned with the inner importance of things, and it is of great value
because it encompasses and exhibits the world as representation in extreme richness while
aiming to show us things as they really are at their essence.
Just as it is necessary for the artist to be able to communicate unconscious material
and to be able to reach the pure knowledge of things, the receiver of the work of art has to
engage with the work of art on a deep enough level for the resistances to abate. Such a
process requires a certain intellectual capacity and willingness on the side of the receiver, the
understanding of art demands a change in the receiver in order for the essence to reach
consciousness, this change is the act of will/ego denial.
As we have understood, Schopenhauer believed that there were two layers of aesthetic
contemplation. The first layer is pure will-less knowing where the pull of beauty itself causes
one to avoid the unpleasant or worrying thoughts of everyday life and fall in a state of calm
contemplation; from that first layer arises the feeling of delight associated with art. One could
speculate that Freud's oceanic feeling has a similar effect on the ego causing it to unwind, and
to seek the pleasure of momentarily forgetting about its struggles. Once the aesthetic
contemplation takes over, the subject indulges in the pleasure of losing the ego/selfboundaries and forgetting about its fear and suffering; here the whole pleasure of the
contemplation resides in such loosening of the ego boundaries. The second layer is the
knowledge of the essence/Idea of the will/unconscious, which in a genuine work of art makes
itself visible as representation. This second layer brings with it perceptions of chaos, and
unsettling feelings regarding the fundamental struggle and discord of the will/unconscious.
Beauty seduces the ego/individual will and pulls them towards it causing them to flow out
into the perceived object, blurring the lines between subject and object. It also causes the
ego/individual will to exert less energy on resistance and therefore allows for the second layer
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of contemplation, the emergence of the universal will/unconscious material, to take place.
This second layer of contemplation is where the possibility of denying the will, of salvation,
occurs.
All suffering resides in our individual will, and in certain types of art the first layer of
contemplation, the turning away from the will, and withdrawal of the subjective side of
consciousness itself constitutes the entire pleasure. In the lowest grade of the will’s
objectivity amongst the arts, architecture already exhibits the will’s fundamental discord.
Such discord in architecture according to Schopenhauer is what makes it beautiful.
Psychoanalytically considered, when viewed as shelter, it is the practicality and importance
of architecture to the ego preservation which first draws the person to it, once the ego is
pulled, the aesthetic side can then make its way through resistance and into the unconscious
affective life.
The plastic and pictorial arts differ from architecture in that they are at a higher level
of the will’s objectivity; therefore, whilst offering the same pleasure of losing the ego
boundaries, feeling at one with the universe and forgetting about all fears and worries, they
also help in the understanding and comprehension of the essence of the self and the world. As
we move through the different arts and the different grades of the will’s objectivity we find
that for Schopenhauer the idea of mankind represents the highest grade of the will’s
objectivity, and that the arts that exhibit human image like painting, human form like
sculpture, or an intense human emotional range like tragic poetry, are considered at a higher
grade of the will’s objectivity than the rest of the arts. Psychoanalytically this could be
attributed to the fact that it is easier for humans, in this case for artists, to project their
transferences and unconscious life onto a human ideal, we often see that even in dreams
however distorted or nonsensical they might be, the ones that leave a strong after effect
always contain a human element. It seems that the higher the grade of objectification of the
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will, the weaker the resistance. Music, on the other hand, for Schopenhauer is unlike the other
arts since it speaks directly from the essences of things, it stems directly from the
unconscious, and psychoanalytically that could be attributed to the fact that music, being
beyond the faculty of reason, is viewed as unthreatening by the ego and therefore doesn’t face
resistances or repressive attempts, giving it an advantage over all the other arts. Music like
tragedy offers us a clear representation of the suffering of our conflicted instincts, and of the
chaos contained in the will; they also manage to still be pleasurable and that is because
through them we learn to view suffering without its relation to our ego/individual will; they
are rather grasped by the id/idea before anything else. It could be argued that such a clear
visibility of the will/unconscious doesn't need to lure the ego/individual will in with beauty, it
rather presents such a stark reflection of the unconscious that the id/idea, now lured in by its
own reflection, compels the individual to engage with the work of art. This could explain
why the ugly, gruesome, and tragic in art still offers an aesthetic satisfaction.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

Connecting Freud's thought with Schopenhauer's and attempting to showcase
Schopenhauer's influence on Freud is not a new topic. Many have attempted it and many
more probably will. The advantage this thesis has in this regard is that it focuses and attempts
to portray philosophy and psychoanalysis with equal clarity and weight. Most of those who
did write on the relationship of the two thinkers seem to have been either inclined towards
philosophy, choosing to compare their ethical and aesthetic theories, therefore missing
important psychoanalytic distinctions, or they seem to have been psychoanalytically inclined,
attempt to isolate the psychological aspects of Schopenhauer's work, therefore missing the
chance to get an impartial picture of both their works combined. One of the things the reader
should come out with from this thesis is that the line between the psychological and the
philosophical in Freud's and Schopenhauer's doctrines is far from clear.
So it comes about that psycho-analysis derives nothing but disadvantages from its middle
position between medicine and philosophy. Doctors regard it as a speculative system and
refuse to believe that, like every other natural science, it is based on a patient and tireless
elaboration of facts from the world of perception; philosophers, measuring it by the standard
of their own artificially constructed systems, find that it starts from impossible premisses and
reproach it because its most general concepts (which are only now in process of evolution)
lack clarity and precision. (Freud, 1925, p. 4125)

In being functional and having an aim such as the removal of mental disturbances,
psychoanalysis already disengages from philosophy and art. It also cannot be classified under
the culturally important but useless. At the time when Freud gave life to psychoanalysis, he
knew he was standing in opposition to psychiatry/science; that being said, he still saw himself
as a man of science. Earlier we touched upon some of the reasons Freud might have been
drawn to avoid association with philosophy. According to Berthold-Bond, Freud wasn't
satisfied with philosophy (metaphysics specifically) and felt that the philosophical tradition
was unable to conquer its resistances in order to 'look into itself', in order to reach health.
Philosophers, according to Freud, used illusory metaphysical explanations of the world as a
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defense against having to actually face the unconscious and its repressed material. Freud's
seeming aggressiveness against philosophy and unwillingness to acknowledge the clear
influence of philosophers like Schopenhauer on him probably sprung from his dissatisfaction
with philosophy (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.275). Freud's dissatisfaction with philosophy wasn't
a passive one. In a letter he wrote to Wilhelm Fliess in 1896, he said that he aimed to create
an objective philosophy. Berthold-Bond speculated that Freud aimed to achieve such an
objective philosophy by transforming metaphysics, the comfort of illusions, into the science
of metapsychology, the psychological reality of everyday life. Psychoanalysis would then be
the sublimation of philosophy since it is willing to face the unconscious and come out with
scientific knowledge regarding the nature of the world (Berthold-Bond, 1989, p.275-277).
Freud was torn between his meta-psychological theories and between defending himself
against the claims of being unscientific.
Schopenhauer claims that both philosophy and poetry seek knowledge of the inner
being of humans, but that they reach it in different ways; they both start from the particular,
but while philosophy seeks a general all-inclusive understanding of the inner nature of things,
poetry speaks from particular and important individual experience. After what has been said
throughout the thesis on philosophy, poetry/art, and psychoanalysis so far, one could argue
that psychoanalysis holds a middle ground between the two, because while it focuses on
individual experience, it also considers itself a science which could have wider application
and explain concepts universally. Now we can ask ourselves, what does it mean for
Psychoanalysis to be situated somewhere between philosophy and art, and between
philosophy and science? Like philosophy and art, it seeks knowledge of the inner nature of
things and an understanding of things in their universality and particularity; but while art and
philosophy start from the point of intuitive knowledge, psychoanalysis claims to start from
scientific functional knowledge. Freud considers his feat, a feat of scientific reason against
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the “wish-projections” of the philosophers. Through translating the abstract/spiritual language
of the philosophers into scientific language Freud believed he achieved his task. (BertholdBond, 1989, p.276, p.279)
Schopenhauer believes that humans have the capacity to view their experiences
poetically hence with artistic eyes, which gets us wondering what it would mean for
psychoanalysis to consider such a notion. Freud often spoke of psychoanalysis as the art of
interpretation, and if we hold him to it and treat the psychoanalyst as the artist and the therapy
process as the work of art in the Schopenhauerian sense it would give us interesting results to
say the least. The analyst like the artist is interested in the inner significance of things, she
looks at the same thing as everyone else but while others deem it as trivial she sees something
different in it, pointing out to the patient personal content, which, has been there all along,
but, which was nevertheless foreign to the patient's own ego. Freud describes the patient’s
state of mind during analysis as such:
He may himself notice that a very remarkable psychological problem begins to appear in this
situation - of a thought of his own being kept secret from his own self. It looks as though his
own self were no longer the unity which he had always considered it to be, as though there
were something else as well in him that could confront that self. He may become obscurely
aware of a contrast between a self and a mental life in the wider sense. (Freud, 1926, p.4331)

The therapy process is similar to the experience of art in that the analytic session
should first and foremost put the patient in a relaxed state (laying on the couch), for the ego
defenses to be lowered, much like we explored how beauty attracts the ego and lures it into
lowering its defenses. The patient is encouraged to free associate, much like how the ego
flows out in the contemplation of art. During free association affects are released through
language just as they are through actions (Freud, 1895, p.11). It's worth mentioning that
Schopenhauer himself believed in the power of association when it came to recalling or
conjuring up unconscious material; he said that we have only to look for the “thread on which
it hangs through the association of ideas” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p.133). The analyst also tries
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to avoid being perceived in the usual relational mode humans usually adopt. She, like the
Schopenhauerian genius artist, is supposed to be a mirror to the other, in this case the patient.
Psychoanalysts realize how hard, sometimes impossible, it is to not be perceived in such a
relational mode, but they nevertheless attempt to do their best to avoid such relativity. The
analyst sits behind the patient for example, so her facial expressions and posture doesn't
affect the patient's self-reflection, she avoids going into any details regarding her personal life
for the same reason. Also, as was pointed out in the last paragraph of chapter four, in
psychoanalysis there is a distinction between the knowledge of the analyst and that of the
patient, the analyst avoids giving advice and opinions and doesn't make interpretations until
the patient is about to make the interpretation himself. In Schopenhauerian terms that could
be because knowledge of Ideas is more valuable than the knowledge reached through
concepts. Once the analyst detaches herself enough to explain to the patient information
regarding their inner selves, she stops being a mirror and they are now both in the realm of
concepts/the ego, where Freud pointed out they would definitely be met with the ego's
resistances, and not Ideas/the id, where the knowledge has conscious access to and influence
over the unconscious. We can already assume that if we wish to correlate the therapeutic
session/process, with a form of art in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, we would most likely
correlate it with poetry. The first and most obvious reason being that they both employ
language and concepts in order to appeal to the imagination of the patient/receiver. Although
psychoanalysis relies immensely on language and speech, Freud sees in psychoanalysis a
different way of perceiving them. The concept/language when employed in therapy and
poetry is not given as an ends in itself, the psychoanalyst doesn’t wish to spoon feed certain
concepts which she believes to be correct, she rather translates the unconscious’s alien
language into one which is familiar to the ego/individual will and harmoniously combines the
translated concepts, so when the time is right, she can lead the patient to use their imagination
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in order to conceive an individual suitable perceived truth out of the abstract concepts. Freud
compared ordinary language to scattered ruins of a temple; some people would settle for such
scattered ruins and derive meaning out of them, while psychoanalysis aims at a language
which not only uncovers the temple but also translates its encryptions and reaches 'undreamt
of information' (Freud, 1896, p.408). When those scattered ruins are put together in
psychoanalytic language they, “are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of
the greatest beauty and significance” (Freud, 1900, p.751). The second reason psychoanalytic
session could be correlated with poetry is that in both the more subjective the artist/analyst is,
the more she thinks she knows what is right or what is helpful and attempts to make us see it
through her eyes, and through subjective induced sympathy she gets us to inhabit her state of
mind, the less efficient the art-work/therapy becomes. The more objective the artist/analyst is
on the other hand the more she allows us to view the will in its true essence.
Finally, if this thesis has achieved what it set out to do, it will leave the reader with a
solid grasp, on one of Schopenhauer's main concepts i.e. the will, on his view on the
importance of the arts, and on his classification of the arts according to their levels of the
objectification of the will. The reader should also come out with a decent grasp on the main
Freudian concepts and their relevance to Schopenhauer's theories, as well as a general grasp
on the development of Schopenhauer's thought through psychoanalysis. Most importantly it
should encourage future interdisciplinary research on psychoanalysis, philosophy, and
aesthetics. Psychoanalytic research would be better off if it did not shy away from its
philosophical roots, if it rather used them for its advancement. Philosophical research would
also benefit from applying a more nuanced understanding of psychoanalysis. A
psychoanalytic take on Schopenhauerian philosophy might give it a new bearing in the sphere
of current philosophical thought. Finally, art would gain a reflective conscious understanding
of its processes through philosophy and psychoanalysis.
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